Polling on mass deportation: no major change

Several polls show some spillage of support for mass deportation, but not enough in my judgment to change administration policy.  Republicans continue to support the administration by over 80% on pretty much every question; Democrats opposed by over 90%. Independents show noticeable slippage but I can’t see how that will affect policy.

Anthony Salvato head of CBS poll polling summarized on January 18 opinions.  “The mass deportation election promise from President Trump, it used to really be a winning one for him. He began the term with majority support. He’s now down to 46% approval. What accounts for that drop? It’s about The Who and the how that’s driving views of it. Who do people think the administration is targeting for deportation? It used to be more people thought it was just dangerous criminals. Now it’s more people think it’s expanded beyond that. That goes with more disapproval of the program. And the how, when I ask people, what do you think of the ICE operations, the tactics that you see, are they about right? No more. People now say they think they’re too tough. That goes with more disapproval. A couple of important points, though. Republicans remain very strongly supportive of this program and Republicans think the protesters against ICE operations have gone too far. Sum it up this way. Difference between the perceived goals and the approach. The goals divide the country are more mixed, but the approach, it gets more negative ratings.”

 

Venezuelan, Syrian, Ukrainian refugees

As of January, 2025 about 7.8 million Venezuelans were displaced outside their country.  At that time, 6.1 million Syrians were outside Syria, and about 6.5 million Ukrainians.  With the overthrow of the Assad regime and change in immigration policy by the Trump administration, what has and is happening to these populations? I will focus on a few key population segments, in sum: Regime change in Syria and decapitation of Venezuelan leadership has not materially affected any reverse migration — and may not for some time

Venezuelans in the United States

At the start of the Trump administration there were on the order of one million Venezuelans in the United States.  Roughly 600,000 were here on Temporary Protected Status, about 115,000–120,000 as humanitarian parolees, and about 300,000 with pending asylum applications.  These large numbers were largely the result of Biden administration policy of pro-active or permissive nature. In January 2021 there were no Venezuelans in humanitarian parole, about 300,000 in TPS, and about 150,000 with asylum applications.

The Trump administration has closed down, or sought to close down with issues still before the courts, the entire humanitarian parole and TPS population of Venezuelans. It is seeking to speed up asylum application decisions.  By eliminating substantially all of these populations, there will remain several hundred thousand Venezuelan-born persons who immigrated, largely before the Biden administration, and enjoy permanent status.  How will the Trump administration account for this population decline? Possibly as a roughly one million person reduction in total “illegal” population. The administration does not use consistently one estimate of those it considers “illegal.”

By removing these one million +/- persons who had some form on legal protection, if this takes place this will be the largest nation-specific forced migration from an advanced country possibly since World War II, noting the massive move of some 6 million Germans from Eastern Europe at the end of that war.

The Trump administration has not taken any public steps to resolve the refugee program throughout Latin America – specially in Columbia – after its capture of Maduro.

Syrians in Europe

Between 2015 and the end of the Assad regime, about 1.4 million Syrians sought and were granted protection in EU countries, more than half in Germany, with large numbers in Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria and Norway.

​The EU’s first act to stem this flow was the EU–Turkey Statement of March 2016, under which “irregular migrants” crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands would be stemmed. At this juncture, Syrians fleeing their country pretty much had to settle in countries neighboring Syria.

In the first six months alone after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, UNHCR estimated that about 600,000 Syrians returned to Syria, the great majority of them from neighboring countries rather than from the EU. Reverse migration from the EU has been minimal. Some countries offer financial incentives. But forced out-migration such as the Trump policy for Venezuelans have not happened for several reasons: (1) refugee status is permanently granted, (2) inter-group conflicts  in Syria remain high, and (3) the EU is aware of the literal and figurative cost of violating “non-refoulement,” or the provision in the 1951 refugee agreement banning the return of refugees from their country of origin. (4) some sections of the refugee population are valued members of the EU workforce.

Germany has been the most visibly successful in integrating Syrian refugees into its workforce. One 1 – 2 % of practicing doctors are Syrian.

Ukrainians in the U.S.

Currently, roughly 250,000 Ukrainians have entered the U.S. in some form of formal recognition, Half of them came through Uniting for Ukraine (U4U), a government / private sector partnership whereby sponsors in the U.S. vouch for the immigrant. The Biden administration applied this model for some Venezuelans as will. The Trump administration has shut down this program for Venezuelans but not U4U.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Comments by Minneapolis mayor on January 14

DHS officers (ICE, Border Control) in Minneapolis were conducting a targeted traffic stop at about 6:50PM, on the 600 block of 24th Avenue North. A Federal officer got into a struggle with a man he was trying to detain. Several persons began to attack the federal officer, who shot the person to be detained. The man received a non-fatal injury.  A crowd formed. Minneapolis police quickly arrived. Later the evening Mayor Jacob Frey and Police Chief Brian O’Hara appeared together at a press conference addressing the incident.

Mayor Frey’s remarks:

​There’s still a lot that we don’t know at this time, but what I can tell you for certain is that this is not sustainable. This is an impossible situation that our city is presently being put in and at the same time we are trying to find a way forward to. Keep people safe, to protect our neighbors, to maintain order. And we’re in a position right now where we have residents that are asking the very limited number of police officers that we have to fight ICE agents on the street to stand by their neighbors. We cannot be at a place right now in America where we have two governmental entities that are literally fighting one another.

Why are we put in this position? We’re put in this position because we have approximately 600 police officers in Minneapolis, far fewer that are able to work at any given time. And there are approximately 3000 ICE agents in the area, 3000. The 600 police officers that we have are charged on any given day with investigating crime, stopping homicides from taking place, preventing carjackings. That’s the work of a police officer in a city. Meanwhile, we have ICE agents throughout our city and throughout our state who, along with Border Control, are creating chaos. This is not the path that we should be on right now in America.

Thankfully, there’s another path, and I want to talk to everybody who’s out there, even people who aren’t living in Minneapolis right now. Maybe you just put your kids to bed. Maybe you’re cleaning up the dishes. I’m sure you love your family. There’s no doubt in my mind that you love your town. Imagine if that city or that town was suddenly invaded by thousands of federal agents that do not share the values that you hold dear. Imagine if your daily routines were disrupted, the local cafe that you eat at was shut down because they’re scared that their own family might get torn apart. Imagine if schools shut down and suddenly parents got to figure out what to do for daycare. This is not creating safety. It’s certainly not creating safety when a huge percentage of the shootings that have taken place so far this year in Minneapolis have been by ICE.

So let’s be very clear, I’ve seen conduct from ICE that is disgusting and is intolerable. If it were your city, it would be unacceptable there too. And for anyone that is taking the bait tonight, stop. That is not helpful. Go home. We cannot counter Donald Trump’s chaos with our own brand of chaos. And I have seen thousands of people throughout our city peacefully protesting. For those that have peacefully protested, I applaud you. For those that are taking the bait. You are not helping and you are not helping the undocumented immigrants in our city. You are not helping the people that call this place home. ICE can leave and this massive deployment can come to an end. We have filed litigation to hopefully make it so. And at the same time, I’m deeply concerned that we don’t have that kind of time. This is already the second shooting that we’ve had in a week. People are scared, the atmosphere is tense. But again, there is another option. We can stop going down this route together.

The Good killing and standing in front of her car

One’s initial response to the fatal incident was shock. Renee Nicole Macklin Good, on January 7, 2026, at about 9:30 AM in the Central neighborhood of South Minneapolis, was shot to death by ICE officer Jonathan E. Ross.

After some time viewing videos, one notices the peculiar way in which Ross circles Good’s car and comes to stand in front of the car.. More precisely, in front of the left front fender. The engine is on, and Good, in the driver’s seat, is approached by another ICE officer who tries to open the driver’s side front door. At this point Ross takes his pistol out of its holster, as if he were anticipating something.  What is going on?

Ross began his career in immigration law enforcement with Customs Border Patrol, 2007–2015. During that period there were many incidents involving the use of deadly force. There was sufficient concern about these incidents that a report was done on them: “U.S. Customs and Border Protection Use of Force Review: Cases and Policies,” published February 2013.

Here are two passages from the report:

Page 8  (under the “Shooting at Vehicles” section): “Based on a review of the submitted cases, it appears that CBP practice allows shooting at the driver of any suspect vehicle that comes in the direction of agents.  It is suspected that in many vehicle shooting cases, the subject driver was attempting to flee from the agents who intentionally put themselves into the exit path of the vehicle, thereby exposing themselves to additional risk and creating justification for the use of deadly force. In most of these cases, the agents have stated that they were shooting at the driver of a vehicle that was coming at them and posing an imminent threat to their life. In some cases, passengers were struck by agents’ gunfire. Little focus has been placed on defensive tactics that could have been used by shooting agents such as getting out of the way.  It should be recognized that a ½ ounce (200 grain) bullet is unlikely to stop a 4,000 pound moving vehicle, and if the driver of the approaching vehicle is disabled by a bullet, the vehicle will become a totally unguided threat.  Obviously, shooting at a moving vehicle can pose a risk to bystanders including other agents.”

Page 6 (under the “Shooting at Vehicles” recommendation): “Recommendation:  Agents’ and the public’s safety will be enhanced by policy changes related to shooting at vehicles.  CBP should make policy changes that restrict agents from shooting at vehicles.  Likewise, agents should be trained to get out of the way of oncoming vehicles as opposed to intentionally assuming a position in the path of such vehicles.”

How Europe overhauled asylum migration

The EU experienced an explosion in migrants in 2015 –1.2 million migrants, almost all seeking asylum and much of it irregular– border crossing without permission).  Already some countries had been dealing with cross-Mediterranean migration. And some migration had been tolerated – for instance Moroccans into Spain. The surge in the mid 2010s prompted a decade of re-organization of asylum policies under the cloud of right-wing attacks.

As of now, migration remains high. Irregular migration remains above 300,000 a year or more. Outstanding asylum applications exceed one million – not much different than 10 year ago. What has changed is a EU-wide system for asylum management designed over the past ten years,

The initial EU response took place in 2016, in an agreement with Turkey which the EU paid  3 billion euros for hosting refugees, in exchange for Turkey accepting returns of irregular migrants from Greece and curbing smuggling routes. The EU-Turkey agreement slashed arrivals from 885,000 in 2015 to about 42,000 by 2017.

In 2020, a commission proposed a comprehensive EU system. The proposed idea was to bring about inter-governmental coordination, guide relations with migrant-sourcing countries and regularize asylum processing. Even this proposal it took years to be formally accepted.

A “New Pact on Migration and Asylum” was drafted in 2023, formally approved in 2024, and today in a phased introduction through mid-2026.

The EU-wide system now being put in place does not expressly refute or change the bedrock global standards for asylum laid out in 1951. However it does some things quite differently such using the applicant’s country of origin to weigh asylum applications and to make formal agreements with countries to house applicants

The reforms introduced mandatory accelerated procedures for certain categories of claims—such as those from safe countries of origin or manifestly unfounded applications—aiming to resolve them within three months, or even 12 weeks in border settings. Asylum applicants can now access the labor market after a maximum of nine months if no decision has been reached, without the need for separate work visas.

Deportation policies: the EU adopted a list including Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, Kosovo, India, Morocco, and Tunisia, where asylum claims from these nations face accelerated scrutiny and higher rejection rates.

Policies now encourage voluntary return by Syrians, with countries like Denmark offering financial incentives up to 27,000 euros. Some 782,000 Syrians have returned from abroad.

Stripping citizenship

The Trump administration appears to be heading willingly into a sharp confrontation with the courts over the grounds for stripping citizenship — denaturalization. The courts for decades have made the allowable grounds very narrow. Here I address stripping as it has been playing out in the U.S. and cite UK policy as point of comparison.

For a deep dive into denaturalization in the U.S: go here.

The U.S. has been stripping citizenship –“denaturalizing” – at an extremely low rate of about 25 persons annually, virtually all for application fraud. The Trump administration reportedly wants to increase that to 100-200 a month.

Law and the Supreme Court decisions have created a high barrier against denaturalization except for application fraud of a material nature that would have caused naturalization to be denied.  And, the Immigration and Naturality Act requires the government to obtain approval from a court, such as a federal district court.

Skip over less ambitious efforts by the first Trump administration to increase denaturalizations – they were less than 100 a year – to this second one. On June 11, 2025 the DoJ issued a memorandum which identified five Civil Enforcement Divisiion priorities. One was denaturalization. The memorandum appears to fly in the face of Supreme Court precedent (noted below). Here is a law firm’s characterization of this section:

“The memorandum announces that “[t]he Civil Division shall prioritize and maximally pursue denaturalization proceedings in all cases permitted by law and supported by the evidence.” It then sets out ten different priority categories for denaturalization, including some (such as “individuals who engaged in fraud”) that could be very broad and conceivably could include individuals with mere misdemeanor convictions. Notably, the memorandum does not indicate that the criminal conduct at issue must have predated naturalization and been undisclosed. The Division therefore might target individuals who committed minor crimes after becoming citizens, where the Division can find some other basis to contend that citizenship was procured unlawfully.”

You cannot strip citizenship due to ideas

The key case is Schneiderman v. United States (1943). William Schneiderman, a Russian immigrant, became a naturalized citizen in 1927. In 1939, the U.S. government sought to revoke his citizenship on the grounds that he was a member of the Communist Party at the time of his naturalization. The government argued his citizenship was “illegally procured” because a Communist could not, by definition, be “attached to the principles of the Constitution.” The Supreme Court ruled 5–3 in favor of Schneiderman, reversing the lower courts’ decisions.

The five judge majority wrote that   “Citizenship is a priceless possession… once conferred should not be taken away without the clearest sort of justification and proof… the evidence must be clear, unequivocal, and convincing, and not leave the issue in doubt.”

“In view of our tradition of freedom of thought, it is not to be presumed that Congress… intended to offer naturalization only to those whose political views coincide with those considered best by the founders in 1787 or by the majority in this [era].”

The Court ruled that even if the Communist Party advocated for revolution, it did not prove that Schneiderman himself intended to use violence: “Under our traditions, beliefs are personal and not a matter of mere association, and that men adhering to a political party or other organization notoriously do not subscribe unqualifiedly to all of its platforms or asserted principles.”

And, “In its consequences it is more serious than a taking of one’s property, or the imposition of a fine or other penalty… it is safe to assert that nowhere in the world today is the right of citizenship of greater worth to an individual than it is in this country.”

Criminal acts as a citizen are not grounds

A case involving stripping due criminal acts  fraud is Trop v. Dulles, heard by the Supreme Court in 1958. The Court overturned a provision in the Nationality Act of 1940 that mandated that anyone convicted of wartime desertion and dishonorably discharged automatically lost their citizenship.

Albert Trop was a native-born American serving in the Army in 1944. He escaped from a military stockade for less than 24 hours, willingly surrendered the next day. He was convicted by a court-martial, dishonorably discharged, and served several years in prison.

In 1952, when Trop applied for a passport, the State Department told him he was no longer a citizen. The Nationality Act of 1940 mandated that anyone convicted of wartime desertion and dishonorably discharged automatically lost their citizenship.

The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that stripping citizenship as a punishment for a crime – of any kind — was unconstitutional. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that denationalization is a “form of punishment more primitive than torture” because it results in the “total destruction of the individual’s status in organized society.” He famously stated that the 8th Amendment must draw its meaning from the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”

The United Kingdom

The UK has been stripping citizenship in recent years at a much higher rate as percentage of persons naturalized than the U.S. In contrast to the U.S. the UK can strip citizenship not just for application fraud but also on the ground of the “public good,” or (citing other law) the citizen acted in a way that was “seriously prejudicial” to UK interests.

Since 2010 about 100 cases a year have been done, most for fraud in applying for citizenship. A minority have been justified as “being for conducive to the Public Good.” Many of these are for involvement with ISIS.   The reason typically involves association with a terrorist organization.

One such act involves Shamima Begum, who  left London for Syria at age 15. Within ten days of arriving in Raqqa in 2015, she married Yago Riedijk, a Dutch ISIS fighter. She gave birth to three children during her time in Syria. All three children died in infancy from illness or malnutrition.  She is known to have participated in ISIS programs.

By virtue of a reporter finding her in camp in 2019, the UK government learned about her case. In 2019, the Home Office stripped her citizenship on national security grounds, arguing the move was “conducive to the public good” due to her alignment with ISIS. She sued to have the decision voided. The UK Supreme Court refused to hear her appeal in August 2024.

Her lawyers argue the decision left her stateless – the UK cannot strip citizenship if that leaves a person stateless. The UK government maintains she is eligible for Bangladeshi citizenship through her heritage. (Bangladesh has refused to grant her citizenship.) Her case is currently being reviewed by the European Court of Human Rights, which is examining whether the UK failed in its duties to her as a potential victim of trafficking. She lives in the al-Roj detention camp in Northern Syria.

The Home Office cited Section 40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981 as its legal authority. This statute allows the Home Secretary to strip a person’s citizenship if they are satisfied that doing so is “conducive to the public good.” In national security cases, this is usually interpreted as removing someone who poses a threat to the country, such as those aligned with terrorist organizations.

 

 

How the SC blocked Trump’s use of the National Guard for mass deportation

The Supreme Court  December 23, in Trump v Illinois, on a 5 -4 vote, put a stop to a singularly Trumpian way to fan the flames of mass deportation. The court barred the administration from using the National Guard for the purposes intended by the administration, which was a very visible and direct (and cosmetic) enforcer of deportation.

Administration said that it could mobilize the National Guard on the grounds that “regular forces” were “unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.”  It sought to thread a legal needle.

In order to mobilize the National Guard of, say, Indiana and deploy them in, say, Chicago, the president needed to federalize the Indiana National Guard and then deploy them. This is allowed in 10 U.S.C. §12406(3). The majority collectively found (there was not one majority opinion) that this step violated two barriers:

First, given as the military had not been involved in Chicago, the administration argued that civilian law enforcement agencies such as ICE were in effect “regular forces” and that they were “unable to execute” the laws. The court, however, defined “regular forces” as the military. But even if the majority of the Court had agreed with the administration that ICE, etc. were part of the regular forces, the mobilized National Guard could not have been used to patrol the streets, as they did in DC, and arrest but used only in a supportive role (like guarding buildings).

Then the majority shot another bullet into the administration’s case. The use of the military (for that is what the National Guard units had become) was only permitted either when Congress permits it (a provision in the Posse Comitative Act) or under the Insurrection Act, but the president did not invoke the Insurrection Act. He did not very likely due to the absence of an insurrection or rebellion and due to DoD resistance.

the court, further, said that protecting building is not an essential aspect “execut[ing] the laws.”

The administration sought to bolster its case by citing Article 2 of the constitution giving the president authority over the armed forces and requiring the president to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The problem here is that Article 2 has been used extremely sparingly, and then only when the risk of or actual violence is very well defined – Little Rock in 1957 and the Los Angeles riots in 1992.  This has certainly not been the case with the nature of local protests against ICE actions.

Christian nationalism and immigration

The Trump administration’s policies regarding migration – permanent and temporary – reflect the view of the strongest supporters of Christian nationalism. Christian Nationalists are estimated to account for half the population of some mountain, Midwest and southern states. Overall they comprise 30% of the entire population. The Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) estimates thay a third – or 10% of the American population – are “adherents” who strongly identify with Christian Nationalism. In this posting I profile this group’s views on immigration.

Supporters of Christian nationalism describe America as founded on Christian God-given principles and believe public life should reflect biblical values, even if the government is not a theocracy. They emphasize faith in the Christian God, moral living, patriotism, traditional social order, and the view that religious influence in American life has declined too far. When one views America as God’s chosen nation with a sacred identity, immigration becomes not just a policy challenge but a form of defilement threatening the nation’s covenant relationship with God. (Go here.)

Below is a topic-by-topic comparison, drawing on an October 2025 PRRI survey and showing the contrast between “All Americans” and adherent Christian nationalists.

Perceptions of Immigrants: A majority of Americans (57%) say immigrants strengthen American society, while 41% disagree. Among Christian nationalism adherents, this reverses sharply: only 31% agree, and nearly 70% express skepticism or outright rejection. While 32% of Americans overall agree that immigrants are invading and replacing the country’s cultural background, fully 67% of Christian nationalist adherents endorse this view.

Legal Status and Citizenship: 60% of Americans favor a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants who meet requirements; only 24% support deportation first. Among Christian nationalist adherents, support for a pathway to citizenship drops below half (49%), while a majority favor deportation-first approaches.

Birthright Citizenship: Two-thirds of Americans (67%) support the constitutional guarantee of birthright citizenship. Christian nationalist adherents are divided, with only 49% in favor, even far below other Christian nationalism categories.

Due Process and Civil Rights: 61% of Americans agree that immigrants should have basic rights, including the ability to challenge deportation in court. Among Christian nationalist adherents, support falls to 37%. Majorities of adherents also support deportation to foreign prisons without due process (57%), a position opposed by nearly two-thirds of Americans overall.

Enforcement and Punitive Measures: One-third of Americans favor arresting and detaining undocumented immigrants with no criminal record; among Christian nationalist adherents, support rises to 57%. Stripping citizenship from those deemed threats is opposed by most Americans (57%) but supported by 63% of adherents.

 

The administration’s rationale for barring nationalities

The precise number of countries whose nationals are barred is not clear.  The presidential action of this month identified 39 countries. Not included in Palestine and Gaza; there can be others added. This posting addresses the bureaucratic reasonins for the bans and provides a summary of 39 countries.

The goverment bases its travel bans on the grounds that visa overstays, corruption and internal instability make it difficult for the State Department to screen visitors to the United States.  One might argue that the challenges to screening are vastly exaggerated.  There have been only about five fatal foreign-born terrorist attacks by these nationalities since 1980. (Since 1980 there have been at least 700 mass murders of at least five persons.) It might well be that other measures to reduce overstays could be applied.

Here is a comprehensive government document, showing how the 39 countries  accumulated over several months.

Most countries are small to very small, and the impact for them on the U.S. society and economic is extremely low. However, Nigeria, with a population of about 233 million, is included.  Most of the countries have stable governments and about half are middle income countries – neither impoverished nor with seriously compromised central governance.

Roughly half of the affected countries have partial, the other half full suspensions.  Partial suspension means that temporary business and students visas are not issued, but an array of more specialized visas is permitted. Full suspension means that virtually all entries are barred.

Visa overstays. The median global overstay rate for all countries appears to be about 2.5%.  The median overstay rate among the affected counties for overstaying business, personal and tourist visas (B-1 and B-2 visas) is 9.95%. The median overstay rate for student visas is 18.43%. the precision of these figures obscures the reality that a lot of intepretation goes into overstay rates.

Administrative failures. Corrupted or otherwise deeply flawed government records (for instance criminal records); corrupt educational certification processes; corrupt passport issuance, refusal to accept deportees who are citizens of the country, and other criteria. Virtually all affected countries are faulted in this area.

Security-based risks. Where State Department screening cannot effectively control for state collapse, terrorist organizations, armed conflict, kidnapping risks, transnational criminal activity, etc. Half of countries fail here. Again, the number of terrorist acts in the U.S. by these nationals is vanishingly small — about 5 in 40 years.

What about the truly major country on the list, Nigeria? It has a business visa overstay rate of about 5% and a student visa overstay rate of about 12%.

List of countries: country name, partial or full suspension, business visa overstay rate if known, and population. Example:  Senegal is partly banned, has a business visa overstay rate of 4.3% and a population of 18,8 million.

Africa — Angola (P; B‑1/B‑2 14.43%; pop. ~37.9m); Benin (P; 12.34%; ~14.6m); Burkina Faso (F; 9.16%; ~23.4m); Burundi (P; rate n/a; ~14.0m); Chad (F; rate n/a; ~19.5m); Côte d’Ivoire (P; 8.47%; ~31.9m); Equatorial Guinea (F; rate n/a; ~1.9m); Eritrea (F; rate n/a; ~3.7m); Gabon (P; 13.72%; ~2.5m); The Gambia (P; 12.7%; ~2.8m); Libya (F; rate n/a; ~7.5m); Malawi (P; 22.45%; ~21.7m); Mali (F; rate n/a; ~22.4m); Mauritania (P; 9.49%; ~5.1m); Niger (F; 13.41%; ~28.2m); Nigeria (P; 5.56%; ~232.7m); Republic of the Congo (F; rate n/a; ~6.2m); Senegal (P; 4.3%; ~18.8m); Sierra Leone (F; 16.48%; ~8.9m); Somalia (F; rate n/a; ~19.0m); South Sudan (F; 6.99%; ~11.5m); Sudan (F; rate n/a; ~50.4m); Tanzania (P; 8.30%; ~68.6m); Togo (P; rate n/a; ~9.3m); Zambia (P; 10.73%; ~21.6m); Zimbabwe (P; 7.89%; ~16.6m).

Asia — Afghanistan (F; rate n/a; ~43 m); Iran (F; rate n/a; ~90.6m); Laos (F; 28.34%; ~7.6m); Myanmar/Burma (F; rate n/a; ~54.1m); Syria (F; 7.09%; ~23.2m); Turkmenistan (P for immigrants only; rate n/a; ~7.1m); Yemen (F; rate n/a; ~40.6m).

Western Hemisphere — Antigua and Barbuda (P; rate n/a; ~0.09m); Cuba (P; rate n/a; ~11.1m); Dominica (P; rate n/a; ~0.07m); Haiti (F; rate n/a; ~11.8m); Venezuela (P; rate n/a; ~28.3m).

Banning nationals from many countries from entering the United States

Nationality-based bans in this administration were introduced in June. By mid December they grew to about 40 countries.

Behind bureaucratic excuses for the bans, which I will take up in a posting tomorrow, the language of the December 16 White House proclamation reveals a xenophobic mindset.  The United States “must ensure that admitted aliens do not intend to threaten its citizens; undermine or destabilize its culture, government or institutions, or founding principles; or advocate, aid, or support designated foreign terrorists or other threats to our national security.”

Here is a history of nationality-based bans starting with the first Trump administration.

This month’s action applies the Supreme Court’s June 2018 approval in Trump v. Hawaii (2018) for the government to apply nationality-based travel bans. At issue was the Presidential Proclamation 9645 – the so-called Muslim bans. This administration has worked up for wider bans a bureaucratic logic that applies like a sledgehammer.

It blows up our relations with countries as prominent as Nigeria and Cuba. There are 500,000 Nigerian-born and 1.7 million Cuban-born persons living in the U.S.

Thanks to David Bier of the Cato Institute, we see the draconian effect of the bans on long-term immigration and temporary business/tourism numbers.  The bans cover countries accounting for one billion persons.  Nationals of these countries have recently accounted for about 125,000 of the annual number of persons who come with or with the expectation of a permanent residence and about 300,000 annual business or tourist visitors. Based on recent experience, third of entries from Africa and a quarter from Asia are affected.

The bans apply to spouses and minor children of American citizens. They apply to persons – such as a professor in a European university – who is a national of a listed country and visits the U.S. regularly for research. It does not matter if the person has had little or nothing to do with their country of origin for years. It applies to sports fans wanting to come to the U.S. to support their national soccer team in the 2026 World Cup, in violation of assurances to FIFA.