Over many years there has been a constant critique of immigrants that they impose a financial burden on local, state and federal governments.  A common approach is to estimate public spending for immigrants without taking into account (1) enormous variation in burden/net contribution based on income, (2) their wage-related taxes and roles in pertinent industries (such as farming), and (3) citizens of matched demographics also are users of the same programs.  This posting highlights some studies.

Below is a relatively succinct take on this issue.   An ultra-simplified summary: low-income households, whether citizens or non-citizens, depend on government benefits – housing, food, medical care – to make ends meet.  As most are federal, it is up to the federal government to decide if and how to make them available.

There are two complicated parts of immigration law which impose, in different ways, constraints on what federal public assistance programs that certain non-citizen foreign-born persons have access to. (Go here for my description of the Public Charge Determination and the Public Benefit Rule – the terms often are used informally)  In all my readings on these standards, it became evident to me that while these standards are necessary, they are based on a core fiction: that to live in the United States, at the lowest quarter of household income, one can survive without at some time using public assistance programs.

First Trump administration Public Charge Rule

The “Public Charge” rule revisions proposed by the first Trump administration in 2018, but held off by a court,  would have effectively barred a very large number of legal low wage immigrants in the country from obtaining green cards. For example, among 48% of farm worker households, at least one person used at least one of the cited public assistance program in the past two years.

The median total income of these primarily farm working households (in 2014) was roughly $25,000. About 20% of all U.S. households have total income under $25,000 (found here). Another 9% have incomes between $25,000 and $35,000. The median household income of non-citizen immigrants in $40,000. (go here). Bottom line: a large share of non-citizen immigrant households are now vulnerable to denial of a green card due to use of public assistance programs actively used by citizen households with low incomes.

Manhattan Institute Sept 2024 study (here and here)

Summary: Immigrants without a college education and all those who immigrate to the U.S. after age 55 are universally a net fiscal burden by up to $400,000. (Grandma coming in at age 65 has imposed a lifetime fiscal drain of $406,000). The large positive fiscal impact of young and college-educated immigrants pulls up the overall average. Each immigrant under the age of 35 with a graduate degree reduces the budget deficit by over $1 million during his lifetime. As for those coming to the U.S. to study, the fiscal impact of the average graduate degree holder who entered the U.S., aged 18–24 is outstandingly positive, which is why the author strongly favors keeping STEM students here to live.

For 18 – 24 year old immigrants without a high school degree, the lifetime net fiscal impact is negative $314,000. The author looks at the impact of a U.S. born person with the same profile and estimates negative $256,000.  This is an interesting comparison as it shows that persons with poor formal education of a fiscal net loss, regardless of birth place.

Cato January 2026 study (here)

Summary: The public burden varies sharply by immigration status, largely because of age. Noncitizen immigrants—those on temporary visas, lawful permanent residents, and unauthorized immigrants—consumed by far the least: about $4,600 per person, or 54 percent less than natives. They represented 7.3 percent of the population but only 3.5 percent of total welfare and entitlement consumption. Their lower use holds across all major age groups and is especially pronounced for Social Security and Medicare, reflecting their younger median age.

Naturalized immigrants show a different pattern. They consumed about $11,500 per capita, roughly 17 percent more than native-born Americans. The study attributes this entirely to demographics: naturalized immigrants are older on average and therefore draw much more heavily on Social Security and Medicare. Once benefits are separated into old-age entitlements versus means-tested programs, naturalized immigrants still consume similar levels of means-tested welfare as natives, but significantly higher old-age benefits.

The Institute of International Education has issued its Fall 2025 figures for international student enrollment.  Compared to the 2024-2025 academic year, which saw 1.2 million international students enrolled, in the Fall of 2025 total enrollment declined by 1%, which masks a 17% decline in new students while current undergraduates rose by 2%. This suggests that the new student flow has sharply cut back while those already enrolled are more determined to complete their degree.

Why the decline in new students? The IIE says colleges blame it on visa problems.

OPT – Optional Training Program – remains as a strong magnet for students.  (Go here and here for my prior posts.) Almost all colleges believe that students would go elsewhere without it. Roughly 330,000 today, approaching 30% of all international students.  As I’ve noted before, OPT is a channel into H1-B which is a channel into a green card. On purely personal perspective I expect this is a major attraction for many students but not valued by others. (Go here and here.)

Some colleges fare better than others in keeping their new international student roster high. One factor is the prestige of the college. One with high prestige will have a longer wait list to draw from if initially admitted students fail to get a visa. (Go here).

This plays out in Massachusetts. Fitchburg State University, with a student body of 6,100, attracted 271 international students in 2023 and only 148 for the 2025-2026 year. (Go here.) U.Mass Boston, which aggressively ramped up its international student numbers since about 2010, reports a 17% decline in first year international student enrollment this fall.

The phenomenon of Northeastern University

I can’t find figures for 2025-2026 international student enrollment at Northeastern  University.  Compared to all other large universities in Boston (Harvard, MIT, Boston University) Northeastern has adopted a long term strategy of being a magnet for large numbers of international students. I doubt whether it is experiencing a set-back in international enrollment.

It is in the very upper ranks of American universities with 20,000 or more international students (along with New York University and Columbia). Northeastern launched a strategy some years ago for a global reach, of which some of the key elements were the following.  Create campuses in English speaking countries where visa problems are unlikely to arise (Toronto, Vancouver, London). Build up the quality of scientific and engineering research to become a major attraction for students (undergraduate and graduate) who want to attend an American university. Maximize opportunities for students to work in the U.S. such as via OPT and H-1B. Use an expanded network globally as a feeder system for talented students.

The report “Exceptional by Design” is not a very original statement in support of skilled immigration, but it synthesizes many studies into one document. It covers the potential use of more of those who come for higher education study and the use of early and mid-career immigrants.  Its argument:

• High-skilled immigrants accelerate innovation—their authorship of 36% of U.S. innovative output since 1990, with each 1% increase in their population share raising patents per capita by 9-18%
• They comprise 19% of National Academy of Engineering members, 24% of National Academy of Sciences members, and 34% of Nobel Prize winners.
• The semiconductor sector where immigrants founded Fairchild Semiconductor, which spawned Intel and Apple, and now account for 34% of patents in strategic fields, enhancing U.S. exports and competitiveness.
• 80% more likely than native-born adults to start businesses, founding not just boutique firms both also 55% of unicorn startups (valued over $1 billion),
• They expand job opportunities more than they compete for them, with H-1B workers earning a median $118,000 (surpassing 90% of U.S. workers).
• They make high-skilled labor less scarce, reduce income inequality, accelerating wage growth faster for low-wage workers while still elevating high-skilled pay.

Here are past postings on the penetration of skilled immigrants (mainly STEM and medicine) in the Boston area, the rise of foreign-born STEM workers over time, and polls showing strong support for skilled worker immigration.

The U.S. information technology sector (computer design, software, AI, etc.) is a major force in the world. When one compares its IT workforce with those of other countries, the role of foreign-born workers stick out.

The United States has 30% – 50% more software engineers per total workforce than does Japan. This is despite the relatively high penetration of numeracy and adaptive skills in Japan compared to other countries (go here).

One major factor behind the U.S. lead is the very high level of foreign-born information technology workers in the United States. The U.S. greatly depends on foreign-born IT workers. 39% of its software engineers are foreign born, compared to 4% in Japan. Japan depends are less on foreign workers throughout its economy than does the U.S (about 3% vs 19%).

For context, the U.S.’ use of foreign-born for software engineering (39%) is much higher than in the U.K. (18%).  There are roughly one million foreign-born software engineers in the U.S. How do they get here?  Among the roughly 700,000 H1-B workers. About half, or 350,000 pf them are software engineers. As I’ve posted before, there is a transnational IT workforce in the U.S. and India. This means that besides having a relatively lot more software engineers compared to Japan, the U.S. has a distinct advantage of being more able to draw easily upon a major supplier of software engineers in the world – India. Language barriers alone create a big barrier for Japan to beef up its software engineering workforce.

The Trump administration plans to greatly increase the size of the temporary visa program for farm workers (H-2A) as it aims to completely shut down the large unauthorized workforce. There is a key change planned for the program. Its aim is to reduce the cost to the employer of using visa workers– and to greatly increase the use of seasonal migrant labor. 

In effect, the Trump administration seeks to completely rewrite the migration story of lower skilled workers for advanced countries, which was “We wanted workers but we got humans.” Its slogan: “We don’t want the humans, just the workers.”

The H-2A visa program began in 1952 allowing U.S. farmers to hire foreign workers for temporary or seasonal agricultural jobs when American workers are unavailable. (The program is for seasonal labor, not available for year-round dairy workers.) Usage has grown from 30,000 visas in 2000 to over 300,000 in 2023. The number of visas is uncapped. Roughly a fifth of visa holders for an agency which deploys the workers to farms.

The growth of use has mirrored a relative decline in unauthorized workers. The widely used estimate for unauthorized workers is over 50% of produce farm workers in California. Employers must prove they can’t find domestic hires, provide free housing, transportation, and pay at least the Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR) to prevent wage depression by using foreign workers this discriminating against U.S. workers.

The Department of Labor just issued an Interim Final Rule to overhaul H-2A wage rules.  The net effect on H-2A workers is to reduce their pay. The Rule does this adjusting the minimum hourly wage by putting a higher value on free housing provided by the employer. Higher housing value (such as $300/month) than in the past causes the minimum wage to do down.  It gives an example: a minimum hourly wage of $17,35 declines to $13.38. The Dept of Labor expects savings for large employers at $5,500 per year, for small employers at $2,200.

Meanwhile, hourly wages of farm workers in California’s Inland Empire have doubled from about $10 an hour in 2020 to about $20 an hour today. The effect of these changes appear to have zero impact on citizens working in farming. It will make the H-2A program more attractive to employers. It will make the H-2A program less attractive to Latin Americans.

Will fewer workers show up? The short answer, based on studies (such as here and here) is no – that the differential in wages for farm workers in, say, Mexico, and the H-2A program is so large that workers will still come.  Expected result: a large increase in the H-2A workforce.  Given as there may over 400,000 unauthorized farm workers in California alone, this change plus ICE enforcement can lead to a doubling of the size of the temporary visa program.

Go here for interesting insights about unauthorized farm workers.