Since 2000, both Japan and the United States have experienced rapid expansion of their personal and elder care workforces. The demographic pressures that drive this demand are more severe in Japan, where by 2030 an estimated 30% of the population will be 65 or older, compared with about 21% in the United States.  How to they compare in staffing for personal care, which is overwhelmingly for elder care?

Japan’s long-term care workforce has roughly quadrupled, rising from about 550,000 workers in 2000 to 2.1 million in 2024. The United States saw its direct care workforce more than double—from roughly 2 to 2.5 million in 2000 to 5.4 million in 2024.  That is, 3% of the Japanese workforce in 2024, compared with 3.2% in the U.S. – basically equal in total workforce dependence.

What about family care, the subject in Yasujirō Ozu films such as An Autumn Afternoon (1962) and Tokyo Story (1953)?  It is possible that in Japan family members today take on more of the burden of personal caregiving in Japan than in the U.S.  The demographics show that a “family burden ratio” — the ratio of persons 45 years old (middle age, with the potential burden of elderly parents) to persons 75 years old is much lower than in the U.S. – i.e relatively fewer 45 year olds compared 75 year olds.  This ratio will worsen in the future in Japan but not appreciatively in the U.S.

But Japan’s share of foreign-born workers in the care sector remains modest—practically zero in 2000, just 0.2% in 2010, around 1.5% in 2020, and about 4% in 2024. Japan relies much less on foreign workers overall (3% of its entire workforce, vs. 19% in the U.S.) and it shows in the tiny numbers of foreign-born personal aides. Japan introduced over the past 10 years some policies to attract foreign works, such as the 2019 “Specified Skilled Worker” program designed to attract overseas caregivers.

Japan depends now mainly on Vietnam, Indonesia and Philippines for these workers. Automation (robots) and domestic recruitment will have to be heroic to be the solution without a major increase in foreign worker involvement.

The U.S. care sector has become increasingly immigrant-dependent. Some estimates say that foreign-born workers represented about 10–13% of the direct care workforce in 2000, rising to close to 30 percent by 2024. In some U.S. states, such as New York and Florida, immigrants now make up over half of all home health aides.  The foreign-born share is at about 40% for home health aides.

Does ICE enforcement cause a major reduction in personal care workers? Estimates of the share of personal care workers who are unauthorized tend to be low – less than 10%. One research team estimated in early 2025 that persons on Medicaid needing personal care will be most adversely. affected.

The U.S. Hispanic population is now one fifth (19.5%) of the total population, compared with under 15% twenty years ago in 2005.

This growth is due to immigration and younger age (and therefore more birth production). This mirrors the age profile: the median age of Hispanics is 31 vs the non-Hispanic population at 41. Interestingly, the fertility rate among Hispanic women, while relatively high in the past, is today very close to the national average of about 1.75.   Even if Hispanic migration grounds to a halt, the relative youth of Hispanics mean many more Hispanic births in the next 20 years.

Since 2010, the Hispanic population has grown annually (compounded) by 2%; the entire non-Hispanic population by 0.4% and the non-Hispanic white population by negative 0.25%.

Hispanic household formation grew an annual average of 2.8% vs non- Hispanics at 0.7%.  Nearly half (44%) of Hispanic heads of household are Gen Z or Millennials (i.e. born after 1980), compared to only 32% of non-Hispanic homes. Hispanic home ownership since 2010 grew six times faster than non-Hispanic home ownership. Household formation is a foundation to a country’s economic health.

Average income growth among Hispanics since 2010 has been 3.8% vs non-Latino at 1.5%. In 2005, the median individual annual income of Hispanics was 40% less than that of whites. Today, it is 25% less (but about by the same absolute amount of $25,000). This is likely do less

Higher education: between 2005 and 2019, Hispanic bachelor’s degree attainment grew at twice the rate (64% vs 31.7%) of non-Hispanic whites during this period.

Between 2010 and 2023 the Hispanic “GDP” (analyzed here) grew by 75% vs 27% for the non-Hispanic population. On an annual basis, the Hispanic GDP growth (compounded) averaged 4%.

The 1990s saw the birth of a transnational information technology workforce of Indians working in the U.S. and in India.  Another transnational farm workforce is that involving Latin Americans and the American Southwest, with its origins before WW 2.  A shared characteristic is circular migration – recycling between two countries. In sharp contrast with the Southwest U.S. transnational workforce, the transnational Indian IT workforce supported important entrepreneurial activity in both the U.S. and India, helping India rise quickly with the growth of the internet to being a major force in the economic growth of India. Between 2000 and 2024, the IT professsional workforce in India grew ten times.

The role model of the transactional workers is an Indian who graduated from the University of Colorado at Boulder with a master’s degree in mechanical engineering, He worked in the U.S. for six years as a computer engineer with an H-1B visa won by visa lottery. He worked as head of product at Compile Inc., a data intelligence company founded in 2012 and based in Bangalore and Menlo Park. McKesson bought Compile in 2024.

The story of this transnational workforce is not the traditional story of an immigrant group migrating to another country, a few finding an economic niche, and through chain migration building a distinctive, durable presence. This was the case with Indians, starting in the 1970s, establishing a role in the American hotel industry.  In this case of IT, symbiosis involving both countries is at the core of the story.

1960s – 1990

US immigration restrictions were relaxed by the Hart-Cellar Act of 1965. A previously existing provision for temporary visa for workers with expertise was revised in 1990 to create the current H-1B visa. India’s educational centers of excellence, institutes of technology, science, statistics and management expanded. American firms begin to install STEM centers in India in the 1980s to take advantage of the Indian workforce. Indian entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley were at that time few — notably Vinod Khosla, He was born in Delhi,1955, graduated from the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Delhi, Carnegie Mellon University and Stanford Business School, and co-founded Sun Microsystems in 1982)

1990: 500,000 Indian born persons resided in the U.S.

By the mid-1990s, many H-1B visas were already going to Indian programmers. China never had a significant H-1B presence due to language limitations.  Many H-1B workers were recruited to handle Y2K code remediation. Indian enrollment in U.S. graduate STEM programs began to rise but was outnumbered by Chinese students.

Outsourcing:  GE, Citibank and other American companies began sending IT work offshore to India. The early Indian firms TCS, Infosys and Wipro secured their first large U.S. contracts. An American model of a U.S. based client team plus a large offshore team was born. Before 1990 TCS had already begun servicing American firms with its India-based staff. By the mid 1990s, it began to scale up its use of H-1B visas for U.S. based placement. Indian firms learned how to become staffing firms for American employers using H-1B.

Entrepreneurism: 7% of Silicon Valley firms founded 1980–1998 had Indian CEOs/founders. According to a 1999 study, immigrants accounted for one-third of the scientific and engineering workforce in Silicon Valley. Indian and Chinese CEOs lead one-fourth of high-tech firms in the region. The concept of “brain circulation” emerged, with skilled immigrants returning to their home countries while maintaining ties to California.

Acceleration of ties between the two countries fostered the growth of the IT industry and IT workforce culture in India. H-1B veterans returned to India with direct experience with American IT management and operations.  Indian educational institutions began to steer their programs to reflect the American IT sector.

The Indus Entrepreneurial (TiE) Network was founded. In its own words (2025), “TiE ranks among the world’s largest ecosystems for innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic development.  Founded in 1992 in Silicon Valley by a group of successful entrepreneurs and corporate executives with roots in the Indian sub-continent, today TiE Chapters worldwide have become a vibrant platform for entrepreneurs, professionals, industry leaders, and investors. With its network of over 33,000 members globally (including over 3,000 charter members) in 62 chapters across 14 countries.”

2000: 0ne million Indians resided in the U.S.

The dot-com boom created huge demand for IT labor. Congress temporarily raised the H-1B cap to 195,000 (1999–2003). Indians took a growing share, surpassing 50% of H-1Bs by the late 2000s. Indian STEM enrollments in American higher ed skyrocketed, especially in computer science. By 2005, India had become the second-largest source of international students (still after China), with most in STEM graduate programs. By the end of the decade, over 100,000 Indians were working in the U.S. using H-1B visas. Over time, a path for an H-1B visa holder to gain a green card was established.

Offshoring becomes mainstream: The 2000s cemented India as the world’s IT back office. It captured 60% of the global offshoring market. U.S. firms sent large volumes of software development, call centers, and business processes offshore. TCS, Infosys, and Wipro became multibillion-dollar firms serving mainly U.S. clients. The business model was cost arbitrage, with American IT wages multiple that of Indian wages.

During the 2000s, American companies began to invest in its own proprietary centers in India. Microsoft established a small footprint in the 2000s. Its India-based workforce grow to over 10,000 in the 2010s and today is in the mid 20,000s. These “global capability centers” have coped with the adverse impact of disruptions in American work visas.

2010: two million Indians resided in the U.S.

Ever more intense use of H-1B visas by Indians took place, many of them working for the major Indian staffing firms. The share of H-1B visas going to Indians soared to 70% and the number of active beneficiaries rose to over 200,000.  A 2010 federal government memo started a crackdown. Infosys made a $34 million settlement in 2013 for visa fraud, yet its enrollments went up.  High-profile cases, like Disney’s 2015 layoffs of American IT workers replaced by H-1B holders from TCS and HCL, fueled a backlash. The first Trump administration raised denial rates to 24% by 2018 and proposed wage hikes. However, clever manipulation of the H-1B rules and the connivance of American clients enabled legal placements at a lower wage than that paid to an American worker.

Middle class Indian-American suburban communities sprung up.  Cupertino, CA, hosts Apple headquarters. Cupertino today is 64% Asian. 77% of workers residing there have management or professional jobs. The city front-ended the rise of the Indian population due to Silicon Valley.  In 1990, 4% were Indian-Americans; in 2010, 23%. An Indian-American became mayor.

Monroe Township, NJ, is the largest and most diverse South Asian cultural hub in the United States. The Township celebrates Diwali as a Hindu holiday. The County prints election ballots in English, Spanish, Gujarati, Hindi, and Punjabi.

Sugar Land, in Fort Bend County, near Houston, has many Hindu temples, Sikh gurdwaras, and cultural associations, and hosts large Diwali festivals. The share of the population that is Asian rose from 10% in 2010 to 35% in 2020.

2020: three million Indians resided in the U.S.

At the outset COVID-19 pandemic, Trump suspended new H-1B entries. The Biden administration lifted the ban in 2021. New H-1B visas for TCS and Infosys fell 20–30% by 2023–2024. These firms today have diversified and depend less on the H-1B market in their business model. In September, 2025 Trump set a $100,000 one-time fee on new H-1B applications. Many Indians use their student F1 visa for one-to-three-year work stays — this program is vulnerable.

Indian IT firms are reported to be increasing their non H-1B staffs in the U.S. These non H-1B staffs in total may exceed 100,000.  Meanwhile, American firms employ several hundreds of thousand Indians in their India offices. Examples: IBM with more than 100,000 and Oracle with 40,000.

 

In the United States today among international students, about 350,000 are in college and about 500,000 in graduate school.  (These figures plus a work study provision add to about 1.1 million which is the common estimate of all international higher ed students.) There are about 425,000 foreign persons graduating with a bachelor’s or graduate degree who due to their student visa (F1) are temporarily authorized to work. This and a few more postings in the future focus on these 425,000 persons.  They are highy vulnerable now to cutback or radical change by the administration.

I am posting because these worker rolls have grown significantly in the past ten years – about tripled – and because given the track record of the administration to using Executive Branch initiative (and not necessarily allowed by law) on visa policies, these students may or may not be in trouble in the months ahead.

An attractive feature of study in the U.S. is the chance to work here, temporarily and possible permanently with a green card. There appears to be upwards of a 50% chance to get a green card if a graduated student obtains a student-related work authorization, hangs in, gets a H-1B visa, and then applies for a green card.

At this moment (September 22) their status does not appear to be threatened by the Trump administrations Executive Order on September 19 in which Trump set a $100,000 entrance fee. This fee appears to be set for future H1-B visa holders. (There are about 700,000 existing H1-B holders.  The Executive Order was rolled out with much confusion – the Secretary of Commerce’s description of it varied from what the White House said. The administration issues immigration-related orders with no advance notice and with apparently little planning.

In this posting the international student-related visas are succinctly reviewed.  International students can work after graduation under two programs:

Standard Optional Training Program (OPT): available to all F1 (student visa) holders for 12 months after graduation. Enrollments rose from about 77,000 in 2014 to about 200,000 today.

STEM-related OPT: able to work for three year if the college or graduate degree was in the STEM area. Enrollments rose from about 21,000 in 2014 to about 200,000 today.

A third program called Curricular Planning Training (CPT) is designed only for students while they are enrolled in school – think college internship placements tied to the student’s major> Their ranks rose from about 92,000 in 2014 to 130,000 in 2014.

Nobody really knows how foreign-born worker totals have changed since December 2024. What about the long view – the entire four years through 2028?

The Administration aims to drive out both unauthorized workers, who in 2024 numbered around 8 million, and workers on humanitarian authorization, whose labor force numbered in late 2024 around one million. So where does that leave total labor force projections for the entire 2025-2028 term? My estimate: NO INCREASE. The labor force in December 2028 will be roughly what it was in December 2024 – around 170 million.

Calculations

Assume that, say, by 2028, three million of unauthorized (8 million in Dec 2024) and all humanitarian program authorized workers (one million in Dec 204) are lost. Legal permanent immigration adds about 600,000 workers a year. (Assume that the administration does not cut that back.)  The native-born labor force grows very slowly. In the year 2024, it barely changed – perhaps grew by 100,000. Looking forward, the native born workforce is projected to remain flat or even decline due to long term demographic trends.

Putting these estimates together, the combined estimate is a reduction, at best no change, in total workforce from 2024 through 2028 –i.e. during the Trump term of office.

The math

Negative 3 million, positive 600,000 x 4 = 2.4 million, and zero increase in native born workers. This comes to a decline of 600,000 during the Trump Administration.  Prudent to assume it will simply not increase if the immigration goals of the administration are met.

I estimated on July 15 that by June 2025 there has been a reduction of at least one million foreign-born workers through June 2025 due to immigration law enforcement. I thought it was reasonable to estimate a reduction of at least 3 million foreign born workers by 2027 if the pace of enforcement stays where it is now.

In late August, Pew Research, the Wall Street Journal and Forbes all pointed to a decline foreign born workers, roughly consistent with my analysis.

Pew Research wrote that 19% of the U.S. labor force were immigrants, down from 20% and by over 750,000 workers since January.

The WSJ, citing DHS figures, wrote that 1.6 million “illegal” persons left the country in the first 200 days of the year (that would be July 19). Since DHS includes as “illegal” persons here on temporary authorized papers, it’s not clear if how many were from the approximately 11-12 million unauthorized persons. Using a workforce ratio of 70% (higher than native born) this suggests a loss of a little over one million workers.

However, my and the other estimates may have overstated the intra-year downward change in foreign-born workers.

Jed Kolko, who knows his federal labor force and employment data methods, cautions against estimates of both high decline in total foreign-born, total unauthorized, and native born employment in January-July of 2025. He shows how intra-year estimates of labor force and employment numbers are fraught with methodological traps.

A 2024 report presents the greater Boston area as thriving on the rise of the immigrant population.

The foreign-born share of the Boston-area population was about 33% in 1900, declining to 13% by 1970, rising again to 19% in 2000, and now about 29%. (This share is equal to that of New York City, double that of Atlanta and Dallas, and 50% higher than that of Seattle.)

Today’s largest groups are from China, the Dominican Republic, India, Brazil, and Haiti. Between 2010–2021, immigrants offset domestic outmigration. Educational attainment is high, with 43% holding a college degree or more. This is 8 percentage points higher than all foreign born and U.S born over the age of 24 in the U.S. About 20% have an advanced degree beyond a bachelors, which is 5 percentage points higher than all foreign born and U.S. born in the U.S.

The hourglass profile of immigrants: A quarter of STEM workers and 30% of medical doctors in the greater Boston area are foreign born. 64% of Chinese have a college degree. Some 35% of persons from the Dominican Republic have college degrees. But a truer measure of economic dispersion is the poverty level of area households: 35% for Hispanics, 27% for Asians, and 7% for white households.   These figures suggest that the classic hourglass of immigrants is present: relative to U.S. born, more are either poor or highly educated. It does, however, appear that second generation immigrants are close to the median of all Greater Boston households in income. This second generation phenomenon is expected.