Japan struggles with finding workers

In the U.S, 7% of workers are 65. Or over; in the UK, 4%. But in Japan, 14% are 65 or older. (The same in Korea: 13%).  Why this huge difference?

Aging: The population of people aged 65 and over accounts for 29.3% of the country’s total population. This is expected to reach 35% by 2040. In the U.S.. they account for 18% of the population. By 2054, they 23% of the population.

Absence of a large foreign-born population: in 2000, about 1.2% of the population was foreign-born. Today, after a decade of targeted but discreetly revealed governmental policies, 3.3% of the population is foreign-born.  Immigration tends to concentrate is early-mid working age (20 – 45 years). In the U.S. foreign-born persons are 14%; in Germany, 19%. OECD countries average 10% of their population as foreign-born.

In the U.S. some 30% of the entire workforce will in the next five years be either first or second generation foreign-born. It is hard to see how this percentage in Japan will be over 5%. (I’ve posted in tbis here.)

The largest sending countries of foreign-born persons in descending order are China, Korea, Philippines and Vietnam. (There are a good number of Brazilians as well, stemming from immigration in the pre-WW 2 period; there are currently 2 million Brazilians of Japanese descent.)

According to an OECD study, eligibility conditions for permanent residency in Japan are strict. Migrants usually need to live ten years in the country to be eligible. Attracting talent is also hindered by low job mobility in the Japanese labor market.

International students are a key resource targeted by Japan’s strategy to attract and retain global talent and have been traditionally the main way for foreign-born persons to settle in the country.  But the numbers are tiny. The number of international students grew from about 140,000 in 2010 to over 300,000 today and the government aims that number to grow.   Compare 300,000 with the size of Japan’s entire workforce of 69 million. In Canada, there are one million international students and a total workforce of 22 million!

EU as a bloc will reduce immigration

The EU will now formally reduce immigration. This is in line with Canada and Australia. And by immigration reduction, it means cutting back on asylum seekers. The politics of immigration into the EU is very influenced by waves of asylum seekers, as it is in the U.S.

Actual annual awards of asylum applications to EU countries has been as high as one million and is now about 300,000.

This needs to be put into a broader context. In 2022 there were. about 4.2 million non-asylum immigrants and about one million non-asylum emigrants, for a net incease of 3.2 million, or about 1/2 of one percent of total population. The total population of the EU, when all countries are taken into account, is about 750 million and has been flat for some years. the prevailing annual rate of net migration to the U.S. is closer to 1/4 of one percent; for Canada, about one percent.

These EU figures do not reflect the reality that most asylum seekers want to live in western and northern Europe, which has a population of about 300 million.

From Politico EU: BRUSSELS — Ursula von der Leyen will propose tougher laws and more plans to deport rejected asylum seekers, doubling down on the European Union’s new embrace of harsher migration policies as anti-immigrant parties gain popularity across the Continent.

More than half of EU member countries, including France and Germany, asked the EU to toughen up its deportations policy ahead of 27 EU leaders meeting Thursday — and now the head of the EU’s powerful chief executive is putting her rubber stamp on deportations.

Von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, said in a press conference that leaders had discussed setting up deportation centers outside the EU’s borders, referring to them as “return hubs.”

……

During the 2000s, the number of asylum applications to the EU wavered between 250,000 and 500,000.  They surged in the early 2010s, in large part due to the Syrian domestic conflict, with applications peaking in 2015 at 1.3 million.  In 2023, they were still elevated at 1.1 million but have recently declined.

The number of actual arrivals can be much less, though they did exceed one million in 2015.  Arrivals have been trending about 300,000 a year.

Spain is the only EU country whose leader advocates for sustain immigration, saying that it meets demand for workers.

 

 

 

 

 

How the Manhattan Institute looks at profit and loss from immigration

A Manhattan Institute report estimates the fiscal impact on the federal budget if a “selectionist” program of immigration were imposed. The study attempts to estimate how the lifetime of an immigrant affects the federal budget, summing some two dozen types of tax revenues and disbursements.  I have a feeling that with Republican control the federal government this study will be widely cited.

Also, the Congressional Budget Office has released a forecast of the impact on the federal budget for 2024-2034 which dramatically shows the opposite of the the Manhattan Institute study. The CBO, by taking into account the total impact on the economy including increased productivity overall by recent Biden-era surge of immigration, projects that the net effect on the federal budget during these years will be a positive $0.9 trillion.  The Manhattan Institute study ignores second effects or externalities. (For instance, in an economy with labor shortages in certain industries, by filling open jobs immigrant workers can boost total employment.)

The study ends with what might be called a Dr. Strangelove Scenario whereby we deport half of unauthorized persons who are a net drain, keep the rest as they are not a net drain, at least as much; push up the relative number of young and educated, and thereby move the total net fiscal impact to the positive. I’m not here going to analysis the steps the author takes, but rather hits the high points.

The study was prepared by a Venezuelan immigrant, Daniel Di Martino, a PhD candidate in economics at Columbia University and a graduate fellow at the Manhattan Institute. The study includes many useful facts about the formal education attainment within key classes of immigrants, by age category.

He concludes: “If all the recommendations made in this report are implemented, the U.S. could reduce the debt and grow the economy by potentially $2.4 trillion over the long run, rising by over $200 billion every year that these selectionist immigration policies remain in place. Selectionist immigration requires taking a strategic approach to immigration that prioritizes young and highly educated immigrants over older and less educated immigrants.”

The author writes that the average native-born citizen is expected to cost over $250,000 to the federal government. (All lifetime figures are net present value.) Thus we start with a situation of net fiscal drain without yet considering immigration.

Immigrants without a college education and all those who immigrate to the U.S. after age 55 are universally a net fiscal burden by up to $400,000. (Grandma coming in at age 65 has imposed a lifetime fiscal drain of $406,000). The large positive fiscal impact of young and college-educated immigrants pulls up the overall average. Each immigrant under the age of 35 with a graduate degree reduces the budget deficit by over $1 million during his lifetime. As for those coming to the U.S. to study, the fiscal impact of the average graduate degree holder who entered the U.S., aged 18–24 is outstandingly positive, which is why the author strongly favors keeping STEM students here to live.

For 18 – 24 year old immigrants without a high school degree, the lifetime net fiscal impact is negative $314,000. The author looks at the impact of a U.S. born person with the same profile and estimates negative $256,000.  This is an interesting comparison as it shows that persons with poor formal education of a fiscal net loss, regardless of birth place.

The author’s desired scenario it to reduce annual immigrant from about one million to 850,000, and to tilt every class of legal immigrant towards a young and educated profile. This includes deporting 5 million unauthorized persons who do not meet certain criteria and legalizing another 5 million. The fiscal impact of seven other changes is relatively modest, yet still substantial.  The scenario envisions doubling the share of new immigrants using economic criteria and lowering total immigration.

 

What does the UNHCR do?

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Refugee Agency, was established in 1950 to help millions of Europeans displaced after World War II. (Some 8 million German speaking persons were expelled from Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union.) Its mission is to protect people forced to flee their homes due to conflict and persecution.

UNHCR operates in 136 countries with over 20,000 personnel. It provides life-saving assistance such as shelter, food, water, and medical care to forcibly displaced communities. The agency also works to defend refugees’ rights, help them find safe havens, and collaborate with countries to improve refugee and asylum laws and policies.

For 2024, UNHCR’s approved budget is $10.2 billion. (Compare this with the annual budget of the state of Maine, $10.5 billion.) UNHCR’s funding comes mainly from voluntary contributions. The largest donors are the United States, the European Union, and Germany,

About 43 million persons today can be considered refugees living outside theiir country of origin. Many are taken care of by host countries such as EU countries and the U.S. If one assumes that UNHCR actively supports only one quarter of the 43 million with direct services (which may be a gross under-estimate), that comes to about $1000 per directly supported refugee per year.

Here is a summary of how the UNHCR describes its work with refugees from Venezuela:

The number of refugees and migrants from Venezuela has surpassed 7 million globally.  70% are concentrated in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Chile. Most are families with children, pregnant women, elderly people, and people with disabilities. Many are facing poverty and struggling to survive.

Half of all refugees and migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean cannot afford three meals a day and lack access to safe and dignified housing. To access food or avoid homelessness, many Venezuelans resort to survival sex, begging or indebtedness. Extremely low salaries further hinder the ability of Venezuelan refugees and migrants to support themselves and their families.

To ensure safe and dignified reception conditions, UNHCR has stepped up its presence in border areas across the region, providing life-saving assistance (including drinking water and hygiene kits for women and children) while ensuring access to territory and asylum, providing legal aid and counselling and upholding refugee law and practice.

UNHCR works closely with local authorities, civil society and the private sector and supports providing vocational training to Venezuelans. UNHCR is also supporting the relocation of Venezuelan refugees and migrants to places with more employment opportunities and services.

A comprehensive cash transfer programme helps refugees and migrants to meet their most urgent needs, such as food, rent and utilities.  UNHCR helps refugees and migrants receive updated and reliable information and a minimum package of services in key locations across the region.

Biden quadrupled refugee admissions over Trump, and more than Obama

The White House announced its refugee goal (and cap) for FY 2025: 125,000. Here are figures since 2016.

During the Trump years when Trump had full control over the entire fiscal year  (FY 2018 – 2020), refugee admissions averaged about 21,000 per year. Biden has increased the count every year, targeting 125,000. 100,034 were admitted in FY 2024. Biden has effectively quadrupled the rate of refugee admissions. (Note: refugees are admitted from outside the U.S., asylees from within the U.S.)

During the Obama years, in years he had fully control. admissisions rose gradually from about 55,000 to about 85,000.

FY 2016: 84,9114, with a cap of 85,000

FY2017: 53,7116, cap set by Obama at 110,000, reduced by Trump to 50,000.

FY 2018: 22,491, with a cap of 45,000

FY 2019: 30,000, which was the cap.

FY 2020: 11,814, with a cap of 18,000

FY 2021: 11,411. The cap was set by Trump at 15,000; Biden increased it to 62,000.

FY 2022: 25,465, cap of 125,000

FY 2023: 60,014, cap of 125,000

FY 2024: 100,034, cap of 125,000

FY 2025: cap of 125,000

Also go to Global Refuge, an outstanding organization.

Higher education: the white advantage as declined and will continue to do so.

The annual wage between four-year college degree holders and others was about $20,000 in 2000 and $35,000 in 2020.  When a group in American society increases its attendance at four-year college, it is not only increasing its average household income but also potentially gaining a larger share of the total college educated population. In 2000, some 45 million persons 25 and older had a four-year college degree. In 2020 about 90 million had a four-year college degree. During these 20 years, the non-white population grew faster than whites and they were increasingly attending four-year college.

Thus, over these 20 years, non-whites significantly narrowed the gap between their college degree attainment and that of whites. I believe that as the white population declines and non-white population continues to grow, the non-white college attainment track record will continue to improve relative to that of whites. Result: whites will have a distinctly lower overall advantage in formal education. By 2040 or so the graduating class of four-year colleges are increasingly likely to be over 50% non-white.

Obscuring this picture is that educational and population statistics do not consistently distinguish non-white from white Hispanics, and do not recognize mixed race. But the overall trend is undisputable.

Detail:

In 2000, about 25% of all white persons 25 years or older had a four-year college degree. This share rose to 33% in 2020. Compare that with non-whites:  in 2000, among non-whites over 25, about 12-14% had a four-year college degree and the share rose to about 23-25% in 2020. Thus, while non-white college rate was about 50% below whites (13%/25%=52%) in 2020, the gap declined to about 30% (24%/33%= 73%) in 2020.

This narrowing of the gap in a key socio-economic credential was due largely to a big jump in college completion by Hispanics, the rise in total Hispanic numbers, and the rise in the Asian population, which always had a college completion rate of over 50%.  Among foreign-born persons 25 years or older, the college graduates rose from 29% to 49% (which reflects the rise of Asia as the source of immigration in the 21st Century).

Between 2000 and 2019, the Asian population grew by 81%, Hispanics by 70%, Blacks by 26%, and non-Hispanic whites by 1.2% (including slight declines in 2016- 2019).

In other words, there are both more non-whites and their college attendance has grown.

Percentage white: Silent Generation ( first year 1928): 79%; Baby Boomers (1946): 72.2%; Generation X (1965): 61.5%; Millennials (1981) : 58%; Generation Z(1997) : 51-52%; Generation Alpha (2012): Less than 50%. Generation Alphas will be entering college in 2030.

 

Hispanic opinions about abortion

Polls suggest that Hispanic Americans have roughly the same opinions about abortion as other Americans. Even Hispanics who self-identify as Republicans are mostly OK with abortion.

We see this when comparing a poll of Hispanics (here) with a poll for the entire population (here and here). For instance, those wanting to ban abortions in most or all cases are 34% of Hispanics and 36% of all AmericansStrong anti-abortion sentiment regarding public policy is heavily concentrated among Republicans and Protestants. Catholic affiliation is not indicative of strong anti-abortion sentiment regarding public policy as opposed to personal preference.

In the Hispanic – specific poll, only 16% say they wany abortion to be illegal.  Among Hispanics who self-identify as Republicans: 43% say that while they oppose abortion, the government should not be making the decision for people, and they should be able to by themselves.  22% say that abortion is morally acceptable and should be legal. 32% say it should be illegal.

 

 

 

Three September polls: what they report about immigration

Three polls are worth reading. Bottom line:  sharp differences of opinion on key issues mask agreement on some; also, that immigration will likely not tilt the November voting by much.

A CNN poll released on Sept 25 reports that 49% of registered voters trust Trump (49%) more than Harris (35%) on immigration. 15% don’t trust either. 33% say that increasing the number of many people of different races. nationalities and ethnic groups threatens America. That’s up from 11% in 2019. This September, 66% say that these groups enrich America down from 82% in 2019.

A Pew Research poll in mid September pitted Trump supporters and Harris supporter against each other. The results were predicable except on educated and skilled immigrants.

The following shows Trump supporters first, Harris supporters second. I’m going to get into the weeds but first note what is to me an important matter of consensus:

Legal immigration should stay as current level: 48% to 44%

This result confirms that which has been a consistent consensus about immigration that lies beneath responses to hot button issues: As a nation, we are OK with immigration in  principle as long as it is done right. This consensus is not what Donald Trump wants.

Here is a predictable consensus about the border:

Improving security along the country’s borders: 96% to 80%.

I view the following result as approaching a consensus: U.S. has little or no control over illegal immigration: 66% to 40%

This consensus is of course why Harris visited Douglas, Arizona on September 27 to make a get tough speech about the border. She proposed tougher measures to constrain border crossings and asylum applications, and promoted the failed bi-partisan bill of early 2014 (go here). Her main focus was on executive branch action, which (per here) has been the default solution for over ten years.

Here are the expected divergences:

Deport all immigrants living here illegally: 88% to 27%

Allow undocumented persons married to a U.S. citizen to stay here legally: 35% to 80%

Admitting more refugees: 49% to 85%

Growing number of immigrants will make things worse: 59% to 11%

Authorized persons should be allowed legally to stay: 33% to 87%

Now, some topics for which there is much more of a consensus. There is a consensus that educated and skilled immigrants help:

Allowing international students who receive a U.S. college degree to stay here: 63% to 89%

Admitting more high skilled immigrants: 71% to 87%

A Suffolk/USA Today poll in early Sept implies that while there is a slight majority for Trump managing immigration better, that does not affect a preference for Harris over Trump in November voting.

In the Suffolk University poll, more respondents said that Trump is better at managing immigration (50% to 47%), consistent with results on the economy, national security and relations with China.  Results on managing race relations and healthcare were dramatically the opposite (about 40% to 55%).

The respondents predicted that Harris will win (50% to 38% to 12% undecided). 90% say their mind is made up, and favor Harris over Trump (48% to 43%).

 

 

 

Do countries whose workers migrate to advanced economies lose or gain?

When less wealthy countries send workers to work in advanced countries, do they suffer or gain in the long run? There is no definitive answer to this question that could be generally applied.

Among the sources of internationally migrant workers have made a point of supporting their citizens working abroad are Kerala State in India, and Philippines.

On the plus side, remittances sent by its migrant workers can make up a significant share of the source country’s economy. These remittances can stabilize foreign exchange. Some returning migrants bring back skills and capital, which can be invested in local businesses and industries. This can lead to economic diversification and development in the region.

On the negative side, emigrating workers may be relatively valuable workers (across the range of formal skills) due to having superior personal work attributes. Thus the source country may lose a disproportionate share of its better workers.  A recent research paper (here) points in this direction.  Also on the negative side, the source country’s political and economic policy may settle into to a chronic state of low expectations for domestic growth, knowing that so much for their country’s economic well-being is dependent on other, much larger, economy.

I have never seen study of the circular flow when skilled workers move to advanced countries and later on invest their added skills and capital back in their country of origin.

And, we need some one to write a book on how the politics of less developed countires are impacted by their diaspora.

The lack of a consensus about how to study the issue of net gain or loss to the sourcing country has becomes more and more painful as the relative size of the international migrant workforce (now over 8% of all workers in the world) and the dependence of emerging economy countries on remittances has grown. Global remittances were $100B in 2000; they are now approaching $700B.