According to an Inside Higher Ed article of August 5, higher ed foreign-born student enrollment is declining by 22% compared to last year. In 2024-2025, foreign student enrollment was about 1.2 million. Enrollment for 2025-2026 is forecasted at one million.

Three universities host at least 20,000 foreign born students – Columbia, with 55% foreign born enrollment, New York University, with 44% enrollment, and Northeastern with 58% enrollment.

In 2000 total foreign-born enrollment was 550,000; In 2010, 690,000. This indicates how in the 2010s some universities built large enrollments of foreign-born students into their academic and financial plans.

Between 1980 and 2020, China’s urban population grew from 190 million to 900 million, almost entirely due to internal migration from rural areas. The internal migration of 300 million persons was the largest migration wave in history.  At the same time, the number of foreign-born persons was miniscule. Shanghai in 1980 had 11 million population and virtually no foreign born. By 2020 its population doubled to 22 million, but in 2020 the foreign-born population was  less than 100,000.

This pattern is completely opposite that of major American cities. Take the forty years between 1870 and 1910. In 1870, New York City’s population was about 900,000 of which 45% were foreign born. By 1910, its population had grown five times to 4.7 million, its foreign born population share remained very high – 41%.

There was a common thread: in both cases, in-migration was by low income persons who formed the basis of a rapidly growing workforce. Large-scale economic growth occurs when an important source of relatively low cost resources is becomes available. In both instances this was migrating workers.

 

Trump’s zero-sum argument against immigration–that it is taking our jobs– appears to have influenced some Democrats whose background includes a history of social and economic suppression to vote for Trump in 2024 (go here).  His argument that immigrants destroy neighborhoods and bring in crime appears to resonate with a large majority of Republicans and with some Democrats, with a sharp increase in concerns about crime (Gallup).  As of late 2024, polling was considerably more anti-immigrant than in the past.

In a June 2025 Gallup poll, support of immigration surged, notably among Republicans. What happened? The virtual disappearance of a Mexican border crisis almost certainly had something to do with it.  Anti-immigrant sentiment may well have been driven by a perception that immigration under Biden was out of control, and that Trump has quickly brought it back in control. The fundamentally positive view of immigration in the country (excepting in particular rural Republicans) may never have eroded.

Another factor may be fatigue over news about harsh deportation practices, norm-busting rhetoric (such as Alligator Alcatraz) and an increasingly strained argument that ICE is after criminals. Every raid on Home Depot and a farm refutes that argument. And it may do with a perception that the country’s low wage workforce is heavily immigrant – a reality most Americans can see with their eyes.

Support for mass deportation policy has been negative for some months. A CNN poll taken in early July showed that 59% opposed ICE going after persons in the U.S. for a long time without a criminal record. And Republican support appears to be wavering; “While only about one-quarter of Republicans and Republican-leaners are opposed to arrests aimed at this group, just shy of half — 47% — offer outright support, far below the 83% who approve of his handling of deportations overall.”

June 6 marks the start of ICE’s very visible large-scale mass deportation campaign, starting in California.  It appears that the campaign, which was since interrupted (or maybe not) by the White House, pushed the public towards disapproval of the administration’s deportation policy.  Pew Research polled the public between June 2 and June 8, so it does not show the full effect of the large scale campaign, which has been visible to the public (for example, here).

That said, the poll results show a something that is an emerging pattern: a slim majority (two polls, here) has in the recent past agreed in the abstract to support Trump’s immigration policy, but when faced with the facts of administration action, a majority opposes it. Overall disapproval has already increased and will most likely increase more. However, there remains solid support among Republicans. And, polling has shown, in the 2010s, a majority concerned about the overall impact on immigration on America.

Overall disapproval is more in this poll than in other recent polls: with 42% approving and 47% disapproving. People are split (50% approve, 49% disapprove) over the use of state and local law enforcement in deportation efforts. 60% of Americans disapprove of the suspension of most asylum applications (39% approve). 54% disapprove of increasing ICE raids on workplaces where people who are in the U.S. illegally.

And 78% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents approve of the administration’s approach to immigration, including 51% who strongly approve.  81% of Democrats and Democratic leaners disapprove, with 63% strongly disapproving. Just 9% approve.

A Fox News poll on June 13 – 16 shows that only 46% of the public approve of Trump’s performance in immigration, and 53% say that the administration has gone to far in enforcing immigration laws. An equal share (39% – 39%) say that the country is safer or less safe due to the administrative actions.

Broad historical context

The underlying issue is how people value immigration as a whole. Gallup polls in 2003, 2013 and 2023 show that the gap between Democrats and Republicans on whether immigration is good for the country widened sharply in the past ten years and even more so in the past five years. There has been for some time an increase in concern that the American way of life has been compromised by immigration. (Go here, here and here).

The Hispanic approval of Republicans surged in the 2022 and 2024 elections but in the past three months economic worries appear to have erased these gains.

Background to 2024/2025

In the 2010s, Democrats had been relying on the support of roughly 90% of Black voters and 70% of Hispanic voters. This implies that per the Dems, the Republican should not receive more than 30% of the vote.

In 2016, according to Edison Research, Trump received 28% of the Hispanic vote

In the 2018 mid-term Congressional elections, an estimated 69% of Latinos voted for the Democratic candidate and 29% backed the Republican candidate. 27% of Latino voters said they were voting for the first time, compared with 18% of black voters and 12% of white voters. (This has been a trend for some time, as Hispanics are coming into adulthood at a relatively faster rate than are others.)

In 2020, Trump won 32% of the Hispanic vote. Thus, the Democrats in the late 2010s achieved its target of 70% of the Hispanic vote, but the percentage was marginally declining. (Go here.)

In the 2022 mid-term Congressional elections, Pew Research estimated that 39% of Hispanic voters cast their ballots for Republican candidates, while 60% supported Democrats. This should have caused flashing red lights.

The Hispanic vote in November 2024

Trump won 46% of the Hispanic vote in November’s election. This percentage is 7% points higher than the 2022 mid-terms and 14% higher than the 2020 election. The swing was heavily among Hispanic men: per Edison Research, by 55% up from 36% for Trump in 2020.  American Electorate Voter Poll put Trump’s support among Latino men at 43%. The Navigator Research post-election survey said received 50% of Hispanic men. According to Edison Research, 38% of Hispanic women voted for Trump in 2024, up from 30% in 2020.

Edison Research wrote, “It’s worth noting that 40% of Hispanic/Latino voters named the economy as their most important issue from a pick-list of five possibilities, nine points higher than the voting population overall.”

Job approval since January 2025

As a point of reference, Biden in January 2020 started with a 73% approval rating by Hispanics, which declined slightly to 69% by the summer of 2021.

Trump’s approval/ disapproval rating among Hispanics in January was 37%/54%. By April the rating worsened to 31%/61%.  This deterioration appears to be caused mainly by economic worries.

UnitosUS reported on April 28, based on its poll, that “Pocketbook issues continue to dominate the concerns of Latino voters — cost of living, jobs, housing and health care affordability — with immigration rounding up the top five. On the economy, 54% of Latino respondents said it is worse when compared to last year; 60% believe things are going in the wrong direction, and 70% of them hold President Trump and his administration responsible.”

In sum, the surge of Hispanic approval of Republicans, dramatically evident in 2022 and 2024 voting, appears to have stalled and even reversed. And, this is due to pocketbook issues.

One important aspect of the Hispanic vote for which we do not have good information: the percentage of voting eligable Hispanics who actually vote is much lower than for whites (something like 60% vs 70%).

 

 

 

 

Spain’s population, now 47.9 million, has been growing at about .025% annually, the growth entirely due to immigration. The fertility rate declined below replacement in 1985 and is now at about 1.2, with the current rate for Spanish born women at about 1.0. The entire population will very slowly decline from now on.

At the end of the 20^th Century, about 2% of the population was foreign born. This surged past 10% in the 2000s due to economic growth – GPD growth averaged 3.3% between 2000 and 2007.

Estimates of the size of the foreign-born population today center around 15%, or about 7 million. That is made up by about Latin Americans, about 2.5 million and rising, approaching 40% of all foreign-born. One million of the seven million residents of the Comunidad de Madrid were born in Latin America.

Other major immigrant groups: Moroccans 12%; Romanians 9%. There are many British and other Northern Europeans with retirement homes. The expatriate numbers around 300,000 (British only)  formally registered but several times that number may be living in Spain informally.