Who is attending college?

The chart below shows that Asian participation at college soars far above other groups. Also that white participation is only moderately more than that of Blacks and Hispanics. 

The rise of the college-attending Hispanic population is quite notable. Pew Research says, “In 1980, there were about 470,000 Latinos enrolled at degree-granting postsecondary institutions, accounting for 4% of all students. By 2000, Latino enrollment had increased to 1.5 million, or 10% of all students. And by 2020, 3.7 million Latinos were enrolled, accounting for a fifth of all postsecondary student.”

This trend is consistent with other socio-economic trends that bring Hispanics closer to the mainstream of American society. I have noted this trend, in particular here.

Americans less demanding of immigrants than most other countries — except for American conservatives

A Pew Research survey shows that American are more accommodating of immigrants than other countries — except for American conservatives.

Across 21 countries surveyed, a median of 91% say being able to speak their country’s most common language is important for being considered a true national, and 81% say sharing their country’s customs and traditions is important for true belonging. Views on the importance of birthplace and religion to national identity are mixed.

A remarkable finding: Americans are noticeably less demanding that people show emblems of national identity than do people in other countries.

Regarding speaking the national language, 78%  of Americans considered it important compared to 91% of the 21 country median.

On sharing the country’s customs and traditions, it was 71% for Americans and 81% for the entire 21 countries.

On being born in the country 50% for Americans bs 58%.

And on being a member of the country’s dominant religion, 37% of American agreed vs. 41% of the entire 21.

In the U.S. self-described conservatives were more insistent in each question than American liberals, usually by a spread of 30 points.  The strongest disparity of American conservatives was regarding religion: 16% of American liberals said it was important; 60% of American conservatives, and as noted above 41% of the entire 21 state set. Western European countries hovered around 30% or less.

Republican recruiting the immigration topic for 2024 elections

After taking some time off, I am back. The most salient immigration issue today is Mexican crossings. The Republican immigration bill H.2 is almost entirely focused on this issue, As I observe below, they is using this topic to address more salient other concerns of large numbers of voters.

Democrats consolidated their support for immigration, while the Republicans as a whole have not moved anti-immigrant, from 2003 to 2023 per Gallup polls. The reality is that only a small segment of the population and electorate consider immigration as a major issue.

Republicans’ views that immigration is good for the country have dropped slightly (55% to 52%), while Democrats’ views have risen a lot (55% to 83%), resulting in 30% partisan gap, a relatively large one. Republicans becoming more likely (55% to 58%) and Democrats (45% to 18%) less likely to say that immigration should be decreased.

Having said that, the issue is far more salient among a many but no all Republicans.

September 25, 2022 interview with Joel Rose of NPR: “In our polling, Republicans just seem to care a lot more about immigration than Democrats or independents do. I mean, we see in our polling, about a third of Republicans consistently list immigration among their top concerns. And for Democrats, it’s just not in that top tier.”

The partisan issue is not immigration per se, but societal deterioration.

In my view, the Republican Party is attempting to show that American society is experiencing a crisis in the American way of life, and that they recruit and mold issues to reinforce their argument.  For example, Republicans link the Fentanyl problem to migration beyond ports of entry.  In this way, they can blame the Fentanyl problem on the Biden Administration even though Fentanyl overdose deaths soared –tripled–during the Trump years.

This is what is driving the move to impeach DHS Secretary Mayorkas: to make him out as an agent of social deterioration.

And they basically make up figures about how Islamic fanaticism is a danger in the U.S. due to illegal immigration.   Since there has been essentially no Islamic terrorism attacks in the U.S. in recent years, this allegation gets no traction.

The Asian countries are aging much faster that the United Stares

Japan has the highest old-age dependency ratio (the ratio of the population over 65 to the working age population aged 15-64) of any major economy in the world. Japan’s ratio was 48.8% in 2020 and is projected to increase by 59%, to reach 77.7% by 2050. This reflects Japan’s longstanding low fertility rates and high life expectancy.

South Korea is aging rapidly as well. Its old-age dependency ratio was 22.3% in 2020 and is forecast to increase by 258%, to 57.7% by 2050. Like Japan, low fertility and rising life spans are driving this.

China today is young. Its ratio is sa low at 17.8% in 2020, but that is set to climb by 274%, to 48.9% by 2050. This represents a huge demographic shift for the world’s most populous country.

Singapore had an old-age depndency ratio of 17.8% in 2020, projected to reach 60.4% in 2050. Singapore shares the challenge of low fertility and rising old-age ratios with its Asian peers.

The United States has much more favorable demographics, with an old-age dependency ratio of 25.5% in 2020, expected to rise by 38%, to 35.3% in 2050.. This is overwhelmingly due to the relatively young Hispanic population (median age 30) vs the entire population (38) and white population (44).

Canada is and will be more aged that of the U.S., from 33% by 72% to 57%.

Thanks to Claude and ChatGPT.

 

Ireland’s population is booming

Ireland, is growing and Dublin has rapidly become a cosmopolitan city

The total population of Ireland in 2000 was approximately 3.8 million, of which 94% were white Irish. The population in 2022 was 5,149,000 of which 3,893,000 or 72% were white Irish. In the 12 months ending April 2023, 141,000 foreign born persons moved to Ireland – equivalent to close to 3% of the total population.  Compared to the flat populations of the EU, Ireland is booming due to immigration.

The country’s population is increasingly concentrated in Dublin, which now houses about a quarter of the entire population.

Go here and here.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A note on climate change and migration

I’ve posted on climate change migration, such as on migration within and from the Sahel (here) and India (here).

The Migration Policy Institute recently issued a primer on climate change and migration. Here is a passage about how relatively little climate change appears to drive migration – except in Africa:

“Environmental issues are generally minor factors in people’s migration decisions, typically far behind economic imperatives even in highly climate-affected countries. For instance, in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, just 6 percent of migrant-sending households cited climate- and environment-related reasons for emigration, according to a 2021 report from the World Food Program, Migration Policy Institute, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Similarly, in Central Africa, just 5 percent of migrants reported they moved for environmental reasons, according to a Mixed Migration Centre survey published in 2022. However, when asked whether the environment affected their decision to move, 50 percent of Central African respondents agreed.”

Why are first generation Hispanics healthier?

Hispanic Americans experience lower rates of certain health issues compared to non-Hispanic whites, sometimes referred to as the “Hispanic paradox.”  The better performance in some key diseases appears to be present in first generation but not later generations.

Hispanic immigrants have lower all-cause, heart disease and cancer mortality compared to US-born non-Hispanic whites. However, US-born Hispanics had similar or worse mortality rates. The age-adjusted death rate for heart disease is about 30% lower.

Among low-income Hispanic subgroups in New York City, being foreign-born is associated with lower prevalence of multiple chronic diseases including cardiovascular disease, hypertension and diabetes. Hispanic patients have 13-30% lower diagnosis rates for five common cancers compared to non-Hispanic whites.

These better rates appear to disappear in second and later generations. Why? One explanation is diet – later generations eat more processed food. Also proposed is that the first generation has closer community and family ties, which presumably keep people healthy,  First generation Hispanics smoke less.  There is a proposal that those who immigration are self-selected relatively tougher, fitter.

The best analysis of the generation discrepancy is here.

Discrimination against Asian Americans

Pew Research has polled Asian Americans about their perceptions of discrimination. The questions did not include employment or housing.)  This is what they found:

78% of Asian adults have been treated as a foreigner in some way, even if they are U.S. born. This includes Asian adults who say that in day-to-day encounters with strangers in the U.S., someone has told them to go back to their home country, acted like they can’t speak English, criticized them for speaking a language other than English in public, or mispronounced their name.

63% of Asian adults have experienced incidents where people assume they are a model minority. This includes Asian Americans who say that in day-to-day encounters with strangers in the U.S., people have assumed that they are good at math and science or that they are not creative thinkers.

35% of South Asian adults say they have been held back at a security checkpoint for a secondary screening because of their race or ethnicity. This is higher than the shares among Southeast (15%) and East (14%) Asian adults. Additionally, Asian American Muslims are more likely than some other major religious groups to say this has happened to them.

32% of Asian adults say they know another Asian person in the U.S. who has been threatened or attacked because of their race or ethnicity since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic.

About half or more of U.S.-born Asian adults and immigrants who came to the U.S. as children (generation 1 1/2) say they have been called offensive names in daily interactions with strangers.

Immigration and conservative response: evidence at the local level

There is some research that has explored a potential link between an increase in foreign-born population in American local communities and a shift toward political conservatism, though the findings are complex and mixed.

One of America’s most respected social scientists, Robert Putnam, at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, has studied the social impact of ethnic diversity. The results shocked him so much that he withheld reporting them for years.  Fighting his personal pro-immigrant leanings, he concluded, “immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital.”

He describes social capital as a collective capacity to spark civic participation and trust, keys to building democracy. In his 2006 lecture, “E Pluribus Unum,” Putnam warned  “The more ethnically diverse a residential context is, the less we trust…” The more racially diverse a community, the less trust exists between neighbors. Even trust within groups is lower in more diverse settings.

Here is a fresh study which looked the local responses which the authors associate with the rise in the number of unauthorized immigrants.

“In response to newcomer unauthorized migrants, county vote share for the Republican party increased in  House and presidential elections. Local government agencies reduced total expenditure, divested in education, and increased relative spending in policing and the administration of justice. Migration creates formal job loss in the construction and hospitality and leisure sectors as jobs moved to the informal sector.  The arrival of newcomers caused an increase in the number of poor people. Established residents, display more outgroup bias. Newcomers generate population loss, especially among white residents.”

Here is the article, published November 2023

Who is supplying new workers to the European working age population?

In spite of relatively low population shares of migrants in Europe, the increase in the European labor supply from 2006 to 2018 was driven by migrants and by foreign-born persons in particular.

In the EU as a whole, the total labor force increased by 4.2 percent between 2006 and 2018 (i.e, an average annual increase of 0.33%). Given that natives’ contribution to this variation was almost zero, the entire increase in the total labor force is attributable to migrants. At the same time, the aggregate labor force participation rate rose by 5.2 percent in comparison to the 2006 level as a result of native-born persons’ limited contribution (by 0.9 percent) and foreign-born persons’ large contribution (4.3 percent). In other words, the growth in EU labor supply from 2006 to 2018, in terms of either the total labor force or the aggregate labor force participation rates, was driven by migrants.

The shifting contribution of foreign-born labor was influenced by a number of factors, including a demographic shift towards an older overall population, changes in work participation by older native born workers, the size of the foreign-born population, and the work participation rate of the foreign born. Generally, the increase in older person participation did not make up for a decline in total younger workers.

Among native born workers, there occurred an increase in the numbers of persons on the relatively old side of the working age population (in their 50s and 60s) and a higher work participation rate for them. Thus the meager growth of the native population in the workforce was disproportionately driven by older workers.

Norway, Italy and Germany were the most affected by a decline in the labor participation rate of natives – a 10% reduction in Norway,

In Sweden, non-migrants contributed 0.7 percent to the increase in the total labor force, whereas migrants’ contribution was 11.4 percent, for a total increase of 12.1% (that is, an average annual increase of about 1% a year). In Italy, the shrinkage in the native-born labor force would have resulted in a decrease in the total labor force by −1.8 percent, but through migrants’ positive effect (7.2 percent), the total workforce increased by 5.4 percent.  Only in the Netherlands was the native born increase in the workforce greater than the foreign-born; in France, the contributions were equal.

From International Migration Review, Christos Bagavos, How Much Does Migration Affect Labor Supply in Europe? 2023