How Many American live outside the US?

Estimates of the number of Americans living outside the United States are very rough and quite varied. Heitor David Pinto delved into the complex way in which one would define and an American (see note below). He does not take into account how many in his estimate may be spending part time abroad and part time in the United States. Overall, he estimates that there are about 5.5 million U.S. citizens who are living outside the country.  1.2 million citizens per his estimate live in Mexico and one million live in Canada. About 300,000 live in the United Kingdom. 280,000 live in Isreal, the equivalent to about 3% of the non-Arab population of Isreal.

Note that the organization promoting Pinto’s estimate, the Associations of Americans Resident Overseas, is most likely to favor a high estimate

How Pinto came to his estimate

The United Nations estimates that about 3 million American live outside the U.S. (go here).

Pinto started from data compiled by the United Nations for 2020 from the most recent census of every country, and updated it with U.S. census data for 2022 and with census data for the years 2010 – 2023 from some individual countries. The census data of each country shows the number of people residing there who were born in each other country so, in the case of Americans abroad, it means only people born in the U.S. Pinto then took the more detailed census data from some countries showing parents’ place of birth to estimate the number of Americans born there from a parent who was born in the U.S., and applied it to all other countries proportionally.

His analysis presents the number of U.S. citizens living abroad as people born in the U.S. plus those born abroad with at least a parent who was born in the U.S. (so it includes the so-called “accidental Americans”). He also included naturalized citizens, assuming that they have the same emigration rate from the U.S. as the rest of the U.S. population. This analysis is an admitted simplification, as it includes some people who are not U.S. citizens (those born in the U.S. from foreign diplomats, or born abroad from American parents who didn’t reside in the U.S. for enough years to transmit U.S. citizenship, or those who renounced U.S. citizenship). But there is no data available to estimate these particular cases and their numbers are thought to be relatively small. Mr. Pinto’s estimate does not include military personnel or their families.

Indians in the US: a thriving and growing community

Today there are about 3 million persons in the United states who were born in India, compared to one million in 2000.  That is a compound annual rate of growth of 5% and that does not take into account the children whom first generation indians are producing. (The annual growth rate for the entire popution was about 0.9%).

Here are some facts, drawn from 2023 by the Migration Policy Institute. They capture how Indians have a distinct advantage over other immigrants and even native born persons in terms of thriving economically.  It is very interesting that Indian immigrants are now quite visible among Republican Party ranks, just as they are among Conservative Party ranks in the United kingdom.

The distinctive profile of Indian immigrants in America today is influenced by several factors that are not readily apparent. The surge in their arrival matched the growing demand for STEM talent. As with most other recent immigrants, they have come well educated and at prime working age. In very different specific ways they are similar to the arrival of German Jews in the 1930s whose talents in science and the arts were quickly absorbed.  Who are the Einsteins and Billy Wilders among our 3 million Indians?

The educational head start: Among persons 25 years or older, 81% of Indians have at least a bachelor’s degree, compared to 35% of all immigrants and 36% of native born. This means that the second generation of Indians grow up in an educated household.

Income is higher: In 2023, households headed by an Indian immigrant had a median annual income of $166,200, compared to $78,700 for all immigrant-led and $77,600 for native-led households. Indian immigrants were roughly half as likely to be in poverty (6 percent) as immigrants overall (14 percent) or the U.S. born (12 percent). Poverty is an income below $30,900 for a family of four in 2023. I suspect that many Indians in poverty are actually students.

Indians have better health insurance coverage: In 2023, just 4 percent of immigrants from India were uninsured, compared to 6 percent of the native born and 18 percent of the overall foreign-born population. Indian immigrants were more likely to be covered by private health insurance than the overall foreign-born and U.S.-born populations, reflecting their strong labor force participation and employment in high-skilled jobs that often come with employer-provided health insurance.

The intergenerational factor: In 2023 their median age was 42 years old, compared to 47 for all immigrants and 37 for the native-born population. This is due to the high number of working-age adults: 81 percent of all Indian immigrants were ages 18 to 64 and 58 percent of the native born.  Behind these figures is that high number of children born to immigrants and who are now counted, of course, as native born.  Immigration is a multi-generational phenomenon – immigrants being more of working age tend to produce relatively more children.

Immigrant parents have higher educational expectations for their children

A study done in 2016 sought to compare the K-12 education experience of children of foreign-born parents with children of U.S. born parents.

The base line economic profile of these households shows that immigrant households overall have lower economic status (though there is the hour glass effect of relatively many immigrant households with little formal education and at the other end a concentration of highly educated immigrants).

The proportion enrolled in charter schools was twice as large among students of immigrant parents as among those with native parents: 12% versus 6%. On the other hand, the proportion enrolled in private schools was only about half as large: 6% versus 10%.

The proportion of students earning “mostly A” grades was 51% among students with immigrant parents and 48% among those with native-born parents. The proportion of parents contacted by their child’s school, due to a learning problem the child was having, was 16% in the immigrant group, versus 22% of U.S.-born parents who had been similarly contacted. The proportion of students diagnosed with a psychological or physical disability was 14% in the immigrant parent group, versus. 24% so diagnosed in the native-born parent group. The study notably did not address if immigrant parents were more concerned about stigmatizing their children.

The proportion of parents contacted by their child’s school, due to a conduct or disciplinary problem the child was creating, was 12% in the immigrant group versus 17% of U.S.-born parents who had been similarly contacted. The proportion of students who had ever been suspended or expelled from school was 4% versus 7%.

The study reported that immigrant children are more likely to live in two parent households.

91% of immigrant parents expected their children to get a college degree, which was significantly higher than the 72% of native parents.  57% of immigrant parents expected their children to get graduate or professional degrees, versus 36% of native parents. Students with immigrant parents who expected them to get graduate or professional degrees were more likely to get A’s in school than those whose parents had lower expectations (57% versus 34%). This was the case even after adjusting for the parents’ education level and family income, the student’s grade level and sex, and whether the student lived with two married birth parents.

Lant Pritchett and rotational migration

Lant Pritchett challenges us to think radically about the global allocation of workers over the next 100 years. He wants us to think about huge numbers of temporary workers. This idea now is completely off the table in the United States. But it’s an idea whose time may be coming.

He is currently Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics in the School of Public Policy and the co-founder and Research Director of Labor Mobility Partnerships. He is a long-time advocate for easing the barriers to global mobility.

I’ve addressed the imbalance between rich and emerging country workforce demographics. Part of the picture is the rise in formal education in the emerging countries, which allows their workers to be more productive.

Among industrialized countries, production of goods and services and the financing of retirement has during the 20th century required much more working age persons as a ratio of older persons.

Rich, industrialized countries will experience shrinking labor forces and increasing elderly populations, while poorer regions, particularly in Africa and South Asia, will see substantial growth in their labor force-aged populations. ​

Pritchett sees these demographic differences as creating a massive opportunity for “age arbitrage,” where young workers from labor-abundant countries can move to labor-scarce, ageing societies through expanded legal pathways, including rotational labor mobility. ​ by 2050, there could be 130 to 300 million people working in rich countries on a rotational basis, depending on various assumptions about labor force participation and migration policies. ​

He argues that with the right legal and administrative arrangements, rotational labor mobility can be implemented in a safe, orderly, and rights-respecting way, benefiting all parties involved. ​

Per Pritchett, a “well-regulated and orderly system for rotational labor force mobility” threads the three-fold political needle facing rich societies by acknowledging three questions about who can legally reside and work in their country:

(1) Who is the “future of us”—who is to be allowed to live and work in our country on a direct expected pathway to citizenship and hence participate in the shaping of the future of “our” society and culture and politics,

(2) Who will we admit as “movers of distress”—how will our country act with respect to refugees, asylum seekers, and those fleeing intolerable conditions (a category which will expand with climate change), and

(3) Who will we allow to legally reside and work in our country on a fixed term basis, and under what terms and conditions (including restrictions on occupations, sectors, regions), in order to help us meet our labor force needs?

One aspect of very large temporary worker flows is who captures the retirement contributions of these workers, the host country or the sending country?

Some facts: From 2020 to 2050 the population 65+ in Italy will grow by 5.4 million (39%) but the population 15-64 will fall by 12.4 million (33%). The projected ratio of the labor force to those 65+ will fall to less than one worker for every person 65+. This is an extreme case of demographic change. In the United States, the demographics are relatively young due to immigration. The ratio between the 15-64 cohort and 65 + shows this trend: 1950, 7.75; 2000, 5.17; 2022, 3.82; 2050, 2.8.

Fertility rates of some countries

Data as of 2023. The replacement rate is 2.1. The global fertility rate of 2.41 is over 2.1 due to African and Middle Eastern countries. The American fertility is elevated by immigration in that recent immigrants are more concentrated in child-bearing years than is the U.S. born population (Immigrants as birthing factory).

Nigeria                  5.13

The World          2.41

Indonesia           2.11

India                       2.0

Russia                   1.82

United States    1.78

China                     1.70

France                   1.68

Brazil                      1.66

UK                           1.44

Germany             1.35

Canada                1.26

Italy                         1.21

 

Latino resentment about surge of temporary immigrants

Propublica reports, “Across the U.S., Latino immigrants who’ve been in the country a long time felt that asylum-seekers got preferential treatment. “Those of us who have been here for years get nothing,” said one woman from Mexico who has lived in Wisconsin for decades.

“ProPublica interviewed dozens of long-established Latino immigrants and their U.S.-born relatives in cities like Denver and Chicago and in small towns along the Texas border. Over and over, they spoke of feeling resentment as they watched the government ease the transition of large numbers of asylum-seekers into the U.S. by giving them access to work permits and IDs, and in some cities spending millions of dollars to provide them with food and shelter.”

The report summarizes well the problem which the Biden administration created:

In the months leading up to the presidential election, numerous polls picked up on the kinds of frustrations felt by Rosa and her family. Those polls indicated that many voters considered immigration one of the most pressing challenges facing the country and that they were disappointed in the Biden administration’s record.

Biden had come into office in 2021 promising a more humane approach to immigration after four years of more restrictive policies during the first Trump administration. But record numbers of immigrants who were apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border began to overwhelm the system. While the Biden administration avoided talking about the border situation like a crisis, the way Trump and the GOP had, outspoken critics like Republican Texas Gov. Greg Abbott amplified the message that things at the border were out of control while he arranged to bus thousands of immigrants to Democrat-controlled big cities around the country. In Whitewater, hundreds of Nicaraguans arrived on their own to fill jobs in local factories, and many of them drove to work without licenses, putting a strain on the small local police department with only one Spanish-speaking officer.

While the Biden administration kept a Trump expulsion policy in place for three years, it also created temporary parole programs and an app to allow asylum-seekers to make appointments to cross the border. The result was that hundreds of thousands more immigrants were allowed to come into the country and apply for work permits, but the efforts didn’t assuage the administration’s critics on the right or left.

 

Aging trends in U.S.

Average annual percentage increase from 2000 to 2050:
1. The entire US population: 0.61% per year
2. The population 65 and older: 2.09% per year

The total US population is projected to increase from 331 million in 2020 to 379 million in 2050, growing at a decelerating rate.  The population aged 65 and older is projected to grow from 58 million in 2022 to 82 million in 2050.

The impact of immigration is captured by the likelihood that by the early 2030s one third of the workforce will be first or second generation immigrants.

Hispanics turned to Trump

Texas’s most Hispanic county, Starr County, voted 57.7% for Trump vs. 41.8% for Harris. 97% of the populations self-identifies as Hispanic. The last time it voted Republican was in 1892.

Lawrence, MA, has the highest concentration of Hispanic persons in the state, at 82% of the city’s population.  Trump received 14% of the vote in 2016, 25% in 2020, and 40% in 2024 (go here.)

Nationwide, per exit polls, Trump won 46% of the Latino vote, up from 32% in 2020. It was the highest share for a Republican presidential candidate in at least 50 years, according to the Boston Globe.

There is a strong trend of greater numbers of Hispanic eligible voters contrasted with a flat or even declining number of white voters. But because Hispanic voting propensity (about 50% of eligible voters)  is much lower than that of whites (about 70%), the power of Hispanics at the voting booth is less than it could be. (Go here and here).

Effect of unauthorized deportations

Brookings notes that starting in the late 2000s there was significant increase of annual deportations, to the level of about 400,000, which then subsided. Neither Obama supporters nor Republicans wanted to note that deportations rose under Obama. (Also go here). Trump has said he will undertake massive deportations of unauthorized residents. (The other day, the Biden administration said it will, in effect, deport some 500,000 humanitarian parole residents when their two years’ stay is up (go here.)

Brookings notes the effect of massive deportation. It does not provide a comprehensive assessment; instead, focuses on a few sectors, and then rather shallowly:

“When construction companies have a sudden reduction in available laborers, they must reduce the number of construction site managers they hire. Similarly, local restaurants need cooks to stay open and hire for other positions like waiters, which are more likely to be filled by U.S.-born workers. Caregiving and household service jobs are also common among unauthorized immigrants. The availability and cost of these services in the private market greatly impacts whether people can work outside the home. “

 

 

Japan struggles with finding workers

In the U.S, 7% of workers are 65. Or over; in the UK, 4%. But in Japan, 14% are 65 or older. (The same in Korea: 13%).  Why this huge difference?

Aging: The population of people aged 65 and over accounts for 29.3% of the country’s total population. This is expected to reach 35% by 2040. In the U.S.. they account for 18% of the population. By 2054, they 23% of the population.

Absence of a large foreign-born population: in 2000, about 1.2% of the population was foreign-born. Today, after a decade of targeted but discreetly revealed governmental policies, 3.3% of the population is foreign-born.  Immigration tends to concentrate is early-mid working age (20 – 45 years). In the U.S. foreign-born persons are 14%; in Germany, 19%. OECD countries average 10% of their population as foreign-born.

In the U.S. some 30% of the entire workforce will in the next five years be either first or second generation foreign-born. It is hard to see how this percentage in Japan will be over 5%. (I’ve posted in tbis here.)

The largest sending countries of foreign-born persons in descending order are China, Korea, Philippines and Vietnam. (There are a good number of Brazilians as well, stemming from immigration in the pre-WW 2 period; there are currently 2 million Brazilians of Japanese descent.)

According to an OECD study, eligibility conditions for permanent residency in Japan are strict. Migrants usually need to live ten years in the country to be eligible. Attracting talent is also hindered by low job mobility in the Japanese labor market.

International students are a key resource targeted by Japan’s strategy to attract and retain global talent and have been traditionally the main way for foreign-born persons to settle in the country.  But the numbers are tiny. The number of international students grew from about 140,000 in 2010 to over 300,000 today and the government aims that number to grow.   Compare 300,000 with the size of Japan’s entire workforce of 69 million. In Canada, there are one million international students and a total workforce of 22 million!