Unitarians and immigration

We Unitarians understand that our shared covenant is not just an internal dialog but also a conversation with the world. The spark to right action is inclusion, expressed in our covenant. This leads to community, then to the safe and culturally prosperous city, then to a safe and more culturally prosperous society. No matter what is said in Washington to fracture America, we are masters of our covenant. And we choose inclusion.

The America that we know best is a society that practices the arithmetic of addition. In truth, our inclusion of people from other countries is part of our inclusion of all others here. That is, our approach to immigration should be in part informed by our advocacy of civil rights over the past 70 years. The immigration act of 1965 was in some respect an extension of the civil rights movement. Civil rights are expressed in the courts, but are expressed more fundamentally in recognizing the other, and in championing the value of lifting all boats in all aspects of life.

Any democracy is founded on the principle of self-determination. Our Unitarian covenant is an expression of this principal. We need, as Unitarians, to say to other Americans that inclusion of others from other countries works.

Including is how we strive to act. It strengthens our self-determination. To say this is not a wistful remembrance of past waves of immigration. We are speaking about today’s world. We as Unitarians not just here but nationwide, are called upon to speak truth for inclusion for our country.

From my reflection at the North Chapel, Woodstock, Vermont, July 8, 2018

the City of Miami, December 9 2025

If the Hispanic population is going to retreat from supporting President Trump – which was noted in the November elections, Miami (city and metro area) will most likely show up as a bell-weather. It may have in the December 9 election for mayor. (Here I track Hispanic national voting since 2016.)

The residents of the City (70% Hispanic) overwhelmingly elected Eileen Higgins (“La Gringa”) as mayor, the first Democrat and non-Hispanic to win the mayoral race since the 1990s and the first woman ever.  Higgins ran openly as a Democrat, notable in that the Congressional delegation in greater Miami is heavily Republican, and Trump won Miami-Dade County in 2024 with 64% of the Hispanic vote (Harris won the City, barely.) As a mayoral candidate she mostly stayed away from addressing immigration policy for the most part, but said in her victory comments, “We are facing rhetoric from elected officials that is so dehumanizing and cruel, especially against immigrant populations. The residents of Miami were ready to be done with that.” (AP, here)

Greater Miami is about six million in population. the City itself has about 450,000 residents. The Congressional district most worth watching is F27, held by Maria Elvira Salazar, It is about one quarter within the City limits. Salazar  is the most outspoken Republican politician in the country in objecting to the administration’s mass deportation policy.  On December 7, Salazar said, “Freezing asylum, green card, and citizenship processes is not the answer. It punishes hardworking, law-abiding immigrants who followed every step of the legal process. That is unfair, un-American, and it goes against everything this country stands for.” (Go here.) Salazar’s district includes a large number of persons whose origins are in three of the 19 countries barred from entry – Cuba, Haiti and Venezuela.

The City is 70% Hispanic, 14% white, 12% Black.  It is behind El Paso in Hispanic concentration (81%) but with a much larger metropolitan area, the Miami area is much the greater national nexus of Hispanic population and political force. (Greater El Paso has one congressional district while greater Miami has 3 or 5 depending on how to measure the metropolitan area.)

Cuban-origin persons make up roughly half of the City’s Hispanic population – a small share of the 900,000 Cubans in greater Miami. Venezuelans have risen in the past few decades to about 6% of the City’s Hispanic population. Over the past 10-20 years the Cuban presence as declined somewhat due to migration into the suburbs, while Colombians, Dominicans, Nicaraguans, Puerto Ricans, Hondurans have increased.

 

 

 

New immigrants have been more working age than the total population

Persons who received a green card in 2019 were 56% between 18- 44, prime working age, compared to 36% of the total population. New green card awardees 65+ are much fewer – 5.4% vs 18%.  (Go here.) Until 2025, immigrants added about 600,000 new workers a year.

This helps to explain the relatively high share of jobs filled by foreign born persons  — 18.6% –compared to the percentage of residents who are foreign born – 14%.

And this helps to explain why high a high percents of new births are by foreign born mothers – 23% compared to the percentage of residents who are foreign born – 14%.  Immigrants comprise a birthing factory (I have addressed this here).

Lincoln in 1858, welcoming immigrants

On July 10, 1858, Abraham Lincoln delivered a speech in Chicago as part of the extended Fourth of July celebrations common to that era. He addressed the question of American identity at a time when the nation was grappling with both slavery and unprecedented immigration.  In his speech, Lincoln transformed American nationality from a matter of national ancestry into a matter of creed—that adherence to the principles of the Declaration created a bond more powerful than bloodlines. He reimagined America as a nation bound by shared commitment to universal human equality.

Lincoln spoke in a city that had elected a Know-Nothing mayor just three years earlier and where xenophobic sentiment against Catholic immigrants ran high. Over the past 25 years, a surge of non-English immigration occurred, raising the percentage of all persons born outside the U.S. from about 2% to about 10%, with much of the migration geographically concentrated.

Between 1831 and 1840, immigration more than quadrupled to a total of 599,000, including about 207,000 Irish and about 152,000 Germans. Between 1845 and 1855 alone, 1.5 million people fled Ireland for the U.S. in the wake of the potato famine. In 1845 – 1855, more than a million Germans came to the United States.  By 1850, around 90% of the population was native-born, down from 98% in 1830. These immigrants settled in concentrated patterns across the nation: the Irish congregated in northeastern cities where they landed, particularly Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. Germans, often arriving with more resources and in family groups, spread across the Midwest to cities like Cincinnati, St. Louis, and Milwaukee, and established farms in the Upper Ohio and Mississippi River valleys U.S.

Lincoln offered a revolutionary argument that effectively elevated these recent German and Irish Catholic arrivals to equal status with the English-origin population at the founding of the Republic. He defined Americans not by ethno-nationalism but by sharing a democract creed. His words:

“If they look back through this history to trace their connection with those days by blood, they find they have none, they cannot carry themselves back into that glorious epoch and make themselves feel that they are part of us, but when they look through that old Declaration of Independence they find that those old men say that ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,’ and then they feel that that moral sentiment taught in that day evidences their relation to those men, that it is the father of all moral principle in them, and that they have a right to claim it as though they were blood of the blood, and flesh of the flesh of the men who wrote that Declaration, and so they are. That is the electric cord in that Declaration that links the hearts of patriotic and liberty-loving men together, that will link those patriotic hearts as long as the love of freedom exists in the minds of men throughout the world.”

The rise of second generation Blacks

Immigrant parents have higher educational expectations for their children than do non-immigrant parents. This helps to explain how the Black immigrant population has created a relatively high performing – (education and jobs) –second generation.

There are a lot of first and second generation Black immigrants.

between 2000 and 2020, the United States added two million new Black immigrants, initially mostly Caribbean-born to more evenly divided between the Caribbean and Africa.  In 2020 there were 4.5 million first generation Black persons, and around 4 million second generation black immigrants. In other words, first and second-generation Black persons account for 20% of the total Black population (47 million) in the U.S.  In 1990, there were very roughly 1.3 million first- and second-generation Black immigrants, or 3% of the Black population (30 million).

The first generation of Nigerian immigrants is very well educated.  But the entire cohort of Black second generation is doing relatively well.

A recent article described the remarkable rise of second-generation Black immigrants in education. Second-generation Black Americans have surpassed both native-born Blacks and Whites in education. In 2019–2024, their college-degree rate for men were 3 points ahead of white man. Second generation Black women graduation was five points ahead of white women.

Pew Research says that “Nearly a third of Black immigrants ages 25 and older (31%) had at least a bachelor’s degree in 2019, up from 21% in 2000. This 10 percentage point increase was larger than the increase among the Black U.S.-born population (8 points), the entire U.S.-born population (9 points) and the entire immigrant population (9 points).”

Black women, for instance, markedly outperform native-born Black women in both education and earnings. Black women earn on average about $31,500 annually. White women on average earn about $39,500. Second-generation Black women earn at or above the White average, therefore significantly more than the Black average.

Go here.

How many unauthorized persons in the US now?

The number of unauthorized persons in the U.S. on December 2000 was 11-12 million. The number as of end of October 2025 is about 14 million. Below is how I arrived at this estimate.

Governmental and non-governmental organizations have differed by a lot on how many unauthorized persons are in the U.S. The disparity is due to several factors, including vague counts of persons permitted to enter temporarily under Biden and pure guesses (using modelling) as to those truly undocumented. 

Prior to the Biden administration there was a consensus that about 11-12 million persons were in the United States.  That included DACA recipients (about 600,000) and asylum applicants.  Both categories are persons here without legal status; their deportation was suspended.   There were small numbers of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and humanitarian parole.

During the Biden administration the following happened to swell the total number. The accounting expressly included persons whose legal status is vulnerable, asylum applicants, TPS and humanitarian parole (DACA numbers did not materially change). It is important to keep in mind that estimates of total “unauthorized” include these categories. They are in fact documented. The core number of truly undocumented – that is without any temporary protection – may be around 10-11 million.

The Biden years saw:

*Those crossing illegally or overstaying temporary visas – I see no count for these. A guess: upwards of 250,000 a year, or 1,000,000 in total

*Increase in asylum cases: about 2,500,000 million

*Temporary protected status: about 500,000 + additional

*Humanitarian parole: about 600,000

LESS those deported /removed or self-deported under Biden: roughly 1,500,000. This assumes a number who left voluntarily, as has been the pattern for decades.

Thus, total in December 2000: 11-12 million

Change under Biden: 4.6 million less 1.5 million = 3.1 million

Total in December 2024: about 14.5 million

In the first nine months of the Trump administration – DHS’s released estimates have been deemed unreliable. Assume 400,000 have been deported and a large number self-deported. The removal of TPS status does not by itself cause the total number to go down. Assume the arrival of undocumented persons is relatively very low, say 100,000.

Thus, as of October 31, 2025: about 14 million.

Here is an informative estimate of the number of unauthorized as of mid 2023. Here is Pew’s estimate for 2023.

The rising trend of the Republican Hispanic voter has reversed

Republicans began to receive more Hispanic votes – until November 4, 2025. The number of eligible Hispanic voters is growing solidely. But be aware of the Hispanic voting deficit!

Background to 2024/2025: In the 2010s, Democrats had been relying on the support of roughly 90% of Black voters and 70% of Hispanic voters. This implies that per the Dems, the Republican should not expect to receive more than 30% of the vote.

In 2016, according to Edison Research, Trump received 28% of the Hispanic vote

In the 2018 mid-term Congressional elections, an estimated 69% of Latinos voted for the Democratic candidate and 29% backed the Republican candidate. 27% of Latino voters said they were voting for the first time, compared with 18% of black voters and 12% of white voters. This has been a trend for some time, as Hispanics are coming into adulthood at a relatively faster rate than are others.

In 2020, Trump won 32% of the Hispanic vote. Thus, the Democrats in the late 2010s achieved its target of 70% of the Hispanic vote, but the percentage was marginally declining. (Go here.)

In the 2022 mid-term Congressional elections, Pew Research estimated that 39% of Hispanic voters cast their ballots for Republican candidates, while 60% supported Democrats. This should have caused flashing red lights.

The Hispanic vote in November 2024

Trump won 46% of the Hispanic vote in the 2024 election. This percentage is 7% points higher than the 2022 mid-terms and 14% higher than the 2020 election. The swing was heavily among Hispanic men: per Edison Research, by 55% up from 36% for Trump in 2020.

American Electorate Voter Poll put Trump’s support among Latino men at 43%. The Navigator Research post-election survey said received 50% of Hispanic men. According to Edison Research, 38% of Hispanic women voted for Trump in 2024, up from 30% in 2020.

The Hispanic vote in November 2025

In the governor’s race in Virginia and New Jersey about 33% of the Hispanic vote went to the defeated Republican candidate. That below the percentage in the last non-presidential election (2022). In Hudson County, NJ, which has a 40% Hispanic population, the Republican candidate received only 25% of the vote, compared to 34% in 2000.

The Washington Post’s graph shows that with a 5% Hispanic share of the population, the total vote went Dem by about 2%, and with a 35-40% share the total vote went Dem by about 15%. there are some extreme outliers.

In sum, the surge of Hispanic approval of Republicans, dramatically evident in 2022 and 2024 voting, appears to have reversed. Is this is due to pocketbook issues, which past polling in early 2025 and before would suggest, or is it in part due higher concern about ICE enforcement?

The Hispanic voting deficit

One important aspect of the Hispanic vote for which we do not have the best information: the percentage of voting eligible Hispanics who actually vote is much lower than for whites (something like 50% vs 70%). And white people is the only race/ethnic group which today supports current ICE practices.

Nationwide, the number of voting eligible Hispanics is growing rapidly. Between 2020 and 2024, their numbers rose from 32 million to 36 million – about 4% a year, vs. an absolute decline in eligible white voters.  Hispanics make up about 22% of the white eligible vote, but only about 15% of these Hispanics vote. How this voting deficit effects Congressional races is a complicated question. But it should be worrisome to national Republican strategists.

For many facts on voting activity by race/ethnicity, go here.

What is driving the Hispanic vote?

Is ICE driving Hispanics to vote for Democrats? If so, how serious is the loss of Hispanic support for Republicans for the November 2026 elections?  This is the first of several posts about the Hispanic vote.

Trump’s immigration policy has split the electorate between poles. Many Republicans think that Trump has not gone far enough. Democrats – too far. (This is an April 2025 poll.)  I’m looking here at sentiment among Hispanics, interested in how this issue may be contributing to a wave of Hispanics who voted for Trump in November 2025 and are shown to switch to Democratic candidates in this week’s November 4 elections.

Polls taken through mid 2025 consistently show among Hispanics relatively high levels of concern about deportation and criticism of ICE action – but I have not seen any report on if concern about the economy and concern about immigration law enforcement stack up relative to each other in impact on voters. Polls such as this one fairly consistently report that Hispanics are more concerned aout their economic well being than about immigration – especially as immigration is typically characterized as legalization of unauthorized persons. What we don’t know is if a combination of fear and anger may touch visceral emotions and spur Hispanics to vote (their rate of voting is low, that is for a follow up posting) and to vote against Republicans.

Opposition to ICE enforcement

June – July polls by various sources show that 60-70% of Hispanics disapprove of ICE raids and other enforcement measures.  Among Asians and Blacks, adverse reaction is slightly less. But notably among Whites, as many support ICE raids as oppose them.

Fear of deportation

Through the 2000’s and 2010, roughly half of Hispanics said to Pew Research pollsters that they were worried that a family member or some one close to them might be deported.  In March 2025 Pew found that 51% of foreign-born Hispanics and 36% of U.S. born Hispanics were worried. 50% of the 18- 49 year old age group were worried.

In a Pew poll in June 2025, 47% of Hispanic adults, 15% of White adults (non-Hispanics, 26% of Black adults, and 29% of Asian adults were worried.

We take from this that a lot of Hispanics are worried about deportations, including many long time residents. For example, 29% of Hispanics both of whose parents were born here – that is, third generation Hispanic immigrants, are worried.

 

foreign personal caregivers: Japan vs U.S.

Since 2000, both Japan and the United States have experienced rapid expansion of their personal and elder care workforces. The demographic pressures that drive this demand are more severe in Japan, where by 2030 an estimated 30% of the population will be 65 or older, compared with about 21% in the United States.  How to they compare in staffing for personal care, which is overwhelmingly for elder care?

Japan’s long-term care workforce has roughly quadrupled, rising from about 550,000 workers in 2000 to 2.1 million in 2024. The United States saw its direct care workforce more than double—from roughly 2 to 2.5 million in 2000 to 5.4 million in 2024.  That is, 3% of the Japanese workforce in 2024, compared with 3.2% in the U.S. – basically equal in total workforce dependence.

What about family care, the subject in Yasujirō Ozu films such as An Autumn Afternoon (1962) and Tokyo Story (1953)?  It is possible that in Japan family members today take on more of the burden of personal caregiving in Japan than in the U.S.  The demographics show that a “family burden ratio” — the ratio of persons 45 years old (middle age, with the potential burden of elderly parents) to persons 75 years old is much lower than in the U.S. – i.e relatively fewer 45 year olds compared 75 year olds.  This ratio will worsen in the future in Japan but not appreciatively in the U.S.

But Japan’s share of foreign-born workers in the care sector remains modest—practically zero in 2000, just 0.2% in 2010, around 1.5% in 2020, and about 4% in 2024. Japan relies much less on foreign workers overall (3% of its entire workforce, vs. 19% in the U.S.) and it shows in the tiny numbers of foreign-born personal aides. Japan introduced over the past 10 years some policies to attract foreign works, such as the 2019 “Specified Skilled Worker” program designed to attract overseas caregivers.

Japan depends now mainly on Vietnam, Indonesia and Philippines for these workers. Automation (robots) and domestic recruitment will have to be heroic to be the solution without a major increase in foreign worker involvement.

The U.S. care sector has become increasingly immigrant-dependent. Some estimates say that foreign-born workers represented about 10–13% of the direct care workforce in 2000, rising to close to 30 percent by 2024. In some U.S. states, such as New York and Florida, immigrants now make up over half of all home health aides.  The foreign-born share is at about 40% for home health aides.

Does ICE enforcement cause a major reduction in personal care workers? Estimates of the share of personal care workers who are unauthorized tend to be low – less than 10%. One research team estimated in early 2025 that persons on Medicaid needing personal care will be most adversely. affected.

Facts about Hispanics in the U.S.

The U.S. Hispanic population is now one fifth (19.5%) of the total population, compared with under 15% twenty years ago in 2005.

This growth is due to immigration and younger age (and therefore more birth production). This mirrors the age profile: the median age of Hispanics is 31 vs the non-Hispanic population at 41. Interestingly, the fertility rate among Hispanic women, while relatively high in the past, is today very close to the national average of about 1.75.   Even if Hispanic migration grounds to a halt, the relative youth of Hispanics mean many more Hispanic births in the next 20 years.

Since 2010, the Hispanic population has grown annually (compounded) by 2%; the entire non-Hispanic population by 0.4% and the non-Hispanic white population by negative 0.25%.

Hispanic household formation grew an annual average of 2.8% vs non- Hispanics at 0.7%.  Nearly half (44%) of Hispanic heads of household are Gen Z or Millennials (i.e. born after 1980), compared to only 32% of non-Hispanic homes. Hispanic home ownership since 2010 grew six times faster than non-Hispanic home ownership. Household formation is a foundation to a country’s economic health.

Average income growth among Hispanics since 2010 has been 3.8% vs non-Latino at 1.5%. In 2005, the median individual annual income of Hispanics was 40% less than that of whites. Today, it is 25% less (but about by the same absolute amount of $25,000). This is likely do less

Higher education: between 2005 and 2019, Hispanic bachelor’s degree attainment grew at twice the rate (64% vs 31.7%) of non-Hispanic whites during this period.

Between 2010 and 2023 the Hispanic “GDP” (analyzed here) grew by 75% vs 27% for the non-Hispanic population. On an annual basis, the Hispanic GDP growth (compounded) averaged 4%.