The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act replaced the restrictionist and explicitly racist Immigration Act of 1924. In 1965 there were 6.9 million foreign-born persons in the United State. Today there about 45 million.
Between 1965 and 2015, new immigrants, their children and their grandchildren accounted for 55% of U.S. population growth. They added 72 million people to the nation’s population as it grew from 193 million in 1965 to 324 million in 2015. Growth of this size was not anticipated in 1965.
In 1980, foreign-born persons were geographically concentrated pretty much as they were in the 1920s – in California, the Northeastern cities, and some old cities in the interior such as Chicago. Since about 1980 they have spread throughout the country.
The combined population share of immigrants and their U.S.-born children was 26% in 2015 and has also certainly risen. That percentage (which leaves out third generation) is projected to rise to 36% in 2065, at least equaling previous peak levels at the turn of the 20th century.
From Pew Research.
Year: 2020
What happened with the caravans?
The Migration Policy Institute is one of the best sources of information about immigration in the United States. Julius Hattem, editor of MPI’s newsletter, wrote on October 16 about caravans from Central America. I have included below his commentary in full.
Two years ago this week, about 160 people set off from San Pedro Sula, Honduras, headed towards Mexico and, for many, eventually the United States. In following weeks their numbers would swell to form a caravan of about 7,000 people that moved into Guatemala and across the Mexican border, traveling in a group for safety and as a political signal. In the United States, the migrants became a rallying cry for President Donald Trump ahead of midterm elections that would see his Republican Party expand its Senate majority.
In recent weeks, another migrant caravan left from Honduras heading north, but this one did not get very far. More than 3,700 Hondurans were turned back in Guatemala, where hundreds of police and military officials set up roadblocks and where, previously U.S. border agents may controversially have been involved in on-the-ground operations. Mexico had similarly deployed a heavy presence along its southern border to block passage.
The episode underscores changing migration dynamics in the Americas and around the world.
For one, it is testament to how the COVID-19 pandemic is fundamentally altering human movement. Guatemalan and Mexican government leaders cited the health crisis as the reason they halted the migrants’ path, although human-rights groups claimed the pandemic was being used as a pretext. Meanwhile, some migrants said that the poverty, violence, and corruption that prompted their flight had only gotten worse during the outbreak.
The caravan’s fate was also a sign of the changing posture by the Guatemalan and Mexican governments, which appear to have coordinated their response. Guatemala had previously done little to stop migrants’ passage, but this time President Alejandro Giammattei declared the travelers could “put us at serious risk” and suspended some constitutional rights to detain them. Mexico, meanwhile, has increasingly taken a tougher posture towards Central American migrants, partly in response to threatened U.S. tariffs.
Finally, the caravan highlighted how immigration has, oddly, faded from the limelight of U.S. politics. Trump built his 2016 campaign around restricting immigration, has taken more than 400 immigration-related executive actions, and can exploit a deep partisan divide on the issue. But with less than a month until the election, the president was oddly quiet about the new caravan. In fact, the politician who connected it to U.S. politics was Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador.
Migration developments can be fluid, as the recent caravan demonstrated. The flows evolve in response to policy, politics, and broader circumstances, all of which are constantly changing.
Best regards,
Julian Hattem
Editor, Migration Information Source
why the decline in unathorized persons?
The total number of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. has declined from a peak in 2007 of abut 12.2 million to 10.5 million in 2017 (This from Pew, no estimates since then). Why?
Enforcement. It is most likely partly due to greater enforcement of immigration laws begun under Obama. The annual number of persons arrested in the U.S. interior doubled from the early 2000s to the second Obama administration; it has since leveled out or declined (even under Trump).
The U.S. economy. The falloff began very likely due to the 2008 financial crisis, which worsened work prospects in the U.S. But in the later 2010s, farming and hospitality industries, which hires many unauthorized workers, did well.
The Mexican economy. GDP growth in the past 20 years has been modest. There is a large informal employment sector. Education has incrementally improved. The country has had a higher percentage of young persons who did not complete high school than most comparable countries. However, it is possible that the odds for a young man to be schooled and get a job in Mexico have probably risen compared to coming illegally to the U.S. and finding employment.
See here and here.
The 10.5 million or so who remain are more likely committed to the U.S. for the long term. They include individuals who are currently DACA-protected (about 825,000) or could be protected with an expansion of the program, plus people who have been here for decades.
The higher educated immigrant
Since 1990, foreign-born persons accounted for upwards of 25% of the net increase (additions minus retirements) of college educated persons in the workforce. This is despite foreign born persons being only about 14% of the entire population and 17% of the workforce in 2018.
This means that computer scientists, doctors, business executives, etc. from India, China, Philippines, Mexico, etc. (The leading sources of college grads) filled one of every four openings for college grads since 2000.
The entire labor force became more highly educated. The share of the labor force with at least a college degree went from 23% in 1990, to 27% in 2000, to 37% in 2018.
But immigrants are even more educated. College educated foreign-born accounted for half of the gain in foreign persons in the U.S. between 2000 and 2018.
A quarter of college educated foreign born persons are in either computing or healthcare. Half of are Asian origin. A quarter live in California. NY, FL and TX combined account for another 30%.
from Migration Policy Institute
Trump vs. Biden on immigration
Andrew R. Arthur of the Center for Immigration Studies compares the two candidates on immigration. While his analysis is very — actually, too — brief, he promises more posts on the comparison.
Local roadmaps for immigration
The New American Economy’s Gateways to Growth program has helped 54 communities in the U.S. to assess and plan for integrating immigrants into their communities. For example, here are excerpts from Bowling Green, KY’s plan:
Bowling Green is the fastest growing city in Kentucky with a 21% growth rate from 2000-2010 with an additional 15% growth between 2011 and 2016. 32.3% of the County’s growth from 2011 to 2016 was attributed to New Americans. Many were refugees.
With a Gateways to Growth grant, the City of Bowling Green created a steering committee. Represented on the committee were government, business, social service, non-profit, entrepreneurs, faith-based, education (K-12, post-secondary, and adult education), public safety, health care, refugee resettlement, housing, and workforce development. The result was a roadmap with many initiatives, including a selection as follows:
Create a liaison position that will connect community stakeholders, businesses, workforce, and Chamber of Commerce partners.
Develop mentorship program to connect New Americans to business professionals and Entrepreneurs
Promote pathways to skilled trades
Support foreign- credentialed New Americans with credential evaluation and state licensure pathway navigation
Promote Adult English Language Learning
Create affordable and safe housing options for New Americans
Providing training on mortgages/loans, rent/ utilities payment, taxes and Insurance
Improve access to health services
Promote and Enhance Civic Engagement
Target: 1,700,000 new green cards a year vs. 780,000 in 2020
The annual growth in the U.S. civilian labor force has declined from 1.2% in the late 1990s to a projected 0.4% in the next ten years. Half of that growth today is due to immigration. As births are now below replacement rate, labor force growth in the future will trend into negative territory except for immigration. For the U.S. to return to at least a 1% annual growth in the labor force, we will probably need to more than double our immigration flows.
An immigration goal might look like this: design the flow of immigrants so that the net annual flow results in 70% of them joining the labor force when they receive their green card (if they are not working here already). Aim for that 70% to equal or exceed 0.75% of the current workforce. This 0.75% today equals 1,200,000 a year. That translates into (1,200K/.7) = 1,700,000 new green cards a year.
A second Trump term will drive immigration down further. A Biden Administration may lead to embracing a this kind of goal. Democrats however do not articulate a coherent immigration strategy in their platforms. For a nation of immigrants, there exists no progressive strategy on the table.

Background:
The Congressional Budget Office just issued a revision of its longterm forecasts. It has lowered its near-term immigration flow by about 20% and it has lowered its labor force increase projections through 2050. Female fertility in the U.S. today is about 1.6 children per female, well below the replacement rate of about 2.1 per female. This bodes for a near-zero annual increase in the labor force when today’s children become adult. The ONLY reason the labor force will increase will be through immigration.
Translating an annual flow of new green cards – perhaps about 790,000 today – into labor force additions requires us to estimate how many of these new recipients join the labor market. With the limitation information provided by the CBO in its new report, I can’t do that. However, it offers a shortcut. The CBO says that net annual immigration in 2020 is 2.9 per 1,000 people in the population.
The Asian voter
The number of Asian eligible voters rose from 4.6 million in 2000 to 11.1 million in 2020, and from 2.4% to 4.7% of the electorate. (There remain 8 million Asians who are either not citizens or are citizens but under the age of 18).
Their party affiliations vary. Vietnamese Americans are more likely than Asian Americans overall to identify as Republican (42% vs. 28%). Indian Americans are the most likely to be Democrats of any Asian origin group, with 50% identifying as Democrats and just 18% as Republican. In 2018 poll, 64% of Vietnamese approved of Trump’s performance vs 28% of Indians and 24% of Chinese.
Based on polling between July 4 and August 16, 2020, among all those who had decided on a candidate to support in the upcoming Presidential race, 65% support Biden and 34% support Trump. These results are consistent with past trends.
If Dems win the WH and Senate, perhaps a surprise in immigration policy?
Trump’s immigration policies may be wrong but they are at least coherent. If the Dems take over Washington, I speculate that their approach to immigration might become more coherent. What shape will that take?
For some years, I have perceived that there is an underground consensus among liberals and conservatives on several aspects of immigration. First, that immigration needs to be more regulated. Jerry Kammer uses that word in his extremely valuable 2020 on immigration, Losing Control. There is an unexpressed feeling among the great majority of persons who pay attention to immigration that, for a country of immigrants, it is shameful that there is no coherent management of immigration.
The second shared but unexpressed consensus is that the unauthorized population needs to be normalized into legal status.
Then there are two ways in which a new consensus may emerge under Dem control.
First, it will emerge that key part of the Democratic constituencies want to limit low skilled immigration. Bernie Sanders has spoken that way. Kammer in his book reviews the misgivings in the organized labor community about low skilled immigration. Hispanics are ambivalent about low skilled, illegal immigration. With Dem control of Washington, it will be politically safe for some Dems to discuss this openly.
Second there is a slowly but then perhaps quick to emerge consensus, that immigration policy must be framed more in response to global trends, of which I see two major ones: the huge amount of skilled talent in the world, and the rise of China as a peer competitor. An immigration policy which addresses these trends will be relatively inclusive and relatively more focused on skilled immigration.
Get Kammer’s book. Lots of good stuff, including how Chuck Schumer screwed up immigration reform in the 1980s and 2010s.
Immigrants and ethnic diversity: decline of social trust and rise of Trump?
This is a relatively long post addressing an issue of great importance in this year in America: the contribution of immigration to social tensions. Is there a relationship? If so, what are the mechanisms? I summarize the case for a relationship and then suggest three somewhat overlapping mechanisms.
In the past 20 years, many researchers have looked at the impact of diversity on the level of social trust in a society. Much of that research focuses on ethnic/racial diversity, as opposed for example on religious and social class diversity. A recent review of 87 research articles found a statistically significant negative relationship betweem ethnic diversity, for example due to immigration, and social trust including social trust within groups.
The Center for Immigration Studies uses this review as evidence of ill effects of immigration.
A seminal study was done in around 2000 by one of America’s most respected social scientists, Robert Putnam. Fighting his personal pro-immigrant leanings, he warned, “The more ethnically diverse a residential context is, the less we trust …” He said the more racially diverse a community, the less trust exists among neighbors. Even trust within groups is lower in more diverse settings.
In thinking about these disturbing findings, it is useful to take several things into account:
First, the studies do not (as far as I can see) address other types of diversity – economic class, social class, religion. Would the emergence of an evangelical community within a traditional Christian domination community also affect social trust? Is increase in diversity related to, say, economic upheavals that erode trust?
Second, these studies do not deeply explore the mechanisms by which diversity reduces social trust within groups. There appears to be little attention given to psychology. I can think of three kinds of mechanisms.
One is the degree to which people sense that they can enjoy reciprocity with one another across ethnic boundaries. Diversity may erode one’s confidence in reciprocity in all instances.
Pre-existing low trust in public institutions may hasten the decline in trust. There appears to be a positive correlation between social trust and a society one the one hand, and trust in government, law and the police on the other hand. Pre-existing low trust in these institutions might aggravate a decline in social trust due to ethnic diversity.
A third possible mechanism is group politics. A culture of leadership may emphasize zero-sum game relations with out-groups, made up threats from outside, preach dependence on the leader to ward off threats, and enforce conformity, and undermine norms of government, law and policing. This might, in the face of diversity, increase psychological distress within the group. I have in mind Donald Trump.