Policy tools to promote innovation include immigration

An academic study published in 2019 (see below) says that, among nine ways to promote innovation in an economy, skilled immigration is one of the best.  The authors don’t delve into how skilled immigration actually works. And I’ve not ever read a study describing how.

In my view, if skilled immigration works exceptionally well, is does so in several related ways: (1) If the immigrant is directly recruited by an organization, they are likely to be slotted into a job which has been vetted by the recruiting firm as high value in advancing a product or service. Let’s call this the Recruitment Effect.  (2) If the skilled immigrant arrives through a research institution, such as a university, they will enter into a network of skilled persons and find a particularly valuable venue and topic to pursue. Let’s call this the Network Effect. (3) The very nature of skilled immigration tends to select for persons who are relatively self-reliant, meaning that they can perceive opportunities and adapt to them more successfully than others. Let’s call this the Personal Predisposed Effect.

If the skilled immigrant is used primarily to lower the cost of labor, by substituting for domestic workers, the innovation benefit doesn’t exist and may hinder innovation.

From “A toolkit for policies to promote innovation,” by Nicholas Bloom, John van Reenen, and Heidi Williams. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 2019

Market economies are likely to under provide innovation, primarily due to knowledge spillover between firms. [That is, companies being discouraged from innovating because competitors will benefit by grabbing shares of the market.) This article has discussed the evidence on policy tools that aim to increase innovation. In the short run, research and development, tax credits, and direct public funding seemed the most effective, whereas increasing the supply of human capital, for example, through expanding university admissions in the area of science, technology, and engineering and mathematics, is more effective in the long run. Encouraging skilled immigration has big effects even in the short run. Competition and open trade policies probably have benefits that are more modest for innovation, but they are cheap in financial terms and also score highly. One difference is that R&D subsidies and open trade policies are likely to increase inequality, partly by increasing the demand for highly skilled labor and partly in the case of trade because some communities will endure the pain of trade adjustment and job loss. In contrast, increasing the supply of highly skilled labor is likely to reduce inequality by easing competition for scarce human capital.

In Table 2 in the article, the highest net benefits are in R&D tax credits, skilled immigration, and trade and competition. The next rank of a net benefits are indirect R&D grants, and universities stem supply. Lower ranked are patent policies, intellectual property reform and “mission-oriented policies” such as “moonshots.” The latter presumably includes the Biden Administration’s CHIPS and Science Act.

Role of immigrants in U.S. business innovation

In 2022, 55 percent of the startup companies in the United States valued at over $1 billion had been founded by immigrants, for a total of 319 companies with a collective value of $1.2 trillion. Among more established technology companies, 60 percent of the top 25 firms were founded by immigrants or Americans with at least one immigrant parent; just under half of Fortune 500 companies were founded by immigrants or their children. One-quarter of the aggregate economic value created by all patents filed between 1990 and 2016 was generated by patents filed by immigrants.

From “Why Bringing Jobs Back to the United States Requires Letting in More Foreign Workers,” By Devesh Kapur and Milan Vaishnav. Foreign Affairs.

Mayorkas interviewed

Ezra Klein interviews Alejandro Mayorkas — a lengthy discussion of measures the Biden administration has taken in the past 12 or so months, which have brought down by (per Mayorkas) Mexican border encounters by 50%. He discusses in some detail these measures, comments on how smuggling became a big business, confirms the crucial role of long delays in immigration court in driving border encounters, and defends the bipartisan bill of early 2024 killed by Trump.  The picture he paints is incomplete, and suffers from the absence of any coherent presentation by Biden or Harris on immigration in whole or in part.

Go here for my posting of my more comprehensive assessment of how encounters at the Mexican border have been affected.

Alejandro Mayorkas was born in 1959 in Havana, Cuba. After the Cuban Revolution his family fled to the United States. He has a BA from UC Berkeley and a J.D. from Loyola Marymount University.  Mayorkas was appointed by President Obama as the director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Between 2016 and 2021 he practiced law in the private sector. On February 2, 2021, Mayorkas was confirmed as Secretary of Homeland Security by the Senate on a 56–43 vote. On February 13, 2024, the House impeached Mayorkas 214-213. The Senate voted 51–49 to dismiss the impeachment charges on April 17, ending the impeachment, without trial

Why recent immigrant estimates differ so widely

Here I draw from an essay by Jed Kolko, posted on Mathew Yglesias’ Substack newsletter, Slow Boring:

Kolko observes that in late 2023 and early 2024, government agencies released wildly different estimates of 2023 net immigration: 1.1 million people, said the Census Bureau, and 3.3 million, said the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). They create a range in estimates of net migration under the Biden administration between 5 and 9 million.

He notes that government agencies, such as the Census Bureau and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), use varying methodologies, leading to significant discrepancies in immigration estimates. The Census Bureau relies on survey data from the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS), which use lagged data. This approach can underestimate recent immigration trends, especially during periods of rapid change. Kolko does not explicitly recognize that the surge in humanitarian program migration (asylum, Humanitarian Parole, and Temporary Protected Status) is very largely Latin American and Caribbean in origin.  The ACS, for example, provides data on foreign-born residents who lived abroad a year ago, but this lag can be problematic when immigration patterns shift quickly.

On the other hand, the CBO incorporates more immediate administrative data, such as visa issuances and border encounters.  This would better capture the humanitarian surge, and possibly also an administrated high figure for undetected migration.  But this method may also overstate immigration due to repeated encounters at the border.

These methodological differences, Kolko concludes, have led to a large gap between Census and CBO estimates, particularly in 2022 and 2023. The Census estimates tend to be lower due to their reliance on lagged data, while CBO estimates are higher, reflecting more recent administrative data.

A gov’t estimate of the immigrant surge under Biden

Estimating the number of foreign born persons in the United States has become much more complicated. I will post tomorrow an analysis of the difficulties in measurement.  The Congressional Budget Office estimated in July that during the Biden administration the numbers shot up to about 3 million a year, 9 million under Biden, or about 1% of the total population per year.   

This rate of 1% of the total population per year us what Canada has experienced purposefully for some years in its policy to attract talented persons as well as to admiy refugees.

This estimate is much higher than past ones. The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas writes that there is “no consensus” as to the number of foreign-born who have entered recently.

The Wall Street Journal, using a study by the, estimates the net growth of foreign-born persons during the Biden administration at nine million persons.  At about 3 million persons per year, that comes to triple the annual volume of pre-Biden years of roughly one million. Green card migration was at or below past trends.  The increase is almost entirely due to undetected unauthorized entries and to  humanitarian programs—asylum, Humanitarian Parole and Temporary protected Status.

The WSJ article notes a change in the educational distribution of Biden are immigration. Prior to 2010, immigrants formed an hour-glass profile of formal educational attainment: many without a high school degree, relatively few with a high school degree, and a good share with an advanced degree. After 2010 the flow of migrants shifted from Latin Americans to more highly educated cohorts, for instance from East Asia and, surprisingly, Nigeria. You show that under Biden the profile went back to the old model.

 

 

 

 

The phenomenal performance of Haitian immigrants

Contrary to the vilification of Haitians by the Republican presidential and vice presidential candidates, Haitian immigrants are a role model. They start from coming from the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere to having a high employment rate and educational profile. These are a role model for assimilation of people from a very poor country.

Roughly 10% of Haitian born persons are now living outside of Haiti, and about half of them are in the United States (go here). Haiti is the poorest of countries in the Central American – Caribbean basin for immigrant labor in the U.S (go here). In 2000 there were 400,000 Haitian-born immigrants in the U.S. This number grew by 200,000 by 2010. the current figure is likely close to 900,000.  Counting for second and third generation Haitian immigrants, there are about 1.1 million persons of Haitian descent today.

Haitians in the U.S. have a relatively low incarceration rate – according to one estimate,  less than a quarter of that of all native-born Americans.

 

Haitian immigrants assimilate better than other immigration groups, evidenced by second and third generation Haitians having a higher educational profile than that of all U.S.-born persons. New immigrants start with low English proficiency and a high poverty rate. It takes several years for a large of recent immigrants to become proficient in English. When they do they have a very high employment rate.

(Note: the high educational status of latter generation Haitians: might the be due to the possibility that early immigrants 1970 – 1990 may have been well educated Haitians who managed to get to the U.S? their offspring may have continued with their patents’ educational pattern.)

Also go here.

Demographic crisis in Cuba

Notes ( from here) on recent emigration from Cuba:

A stunning 10% of Cuba’s population — more than a million people — left the island between 2022 and 2023, the head of the country’s national statistics office said during a National Assembly session Friday, the largest migration wave in Cuban history.

According to the official figures made public for the first time, Cuba’s population went from 11,181,595 on Dec. 31, 2021, to 10,055,968 on December 2023. The emigration of 1,011,269 Cubans was the main factor contributing to a massive fall in Cuba’s population by the end of 2023, when the population stood at a number similar to what it was in 1985, said Juan Carlos Alfonso Fraga, the head of the National Statistics and Information Office. Other factors were a high number of deaths, 405,512, and a low birth rate, with only 284,892 children born in that period.

Of the million-plus people who left the island between 2022 and 2023, about 800,000 were between the ages of 15 and 59, which, combined with the island’s increasingly older population, would significantly affect the labor force, the cost of social programs and the sustainability of social security.

It appears that the large majority of those leaving have and are attempting to enter into the U.S. through the humanitarian parole program created by the Biden Administration for residents of Cuba and three other countries, two of which – Nicaragua and Venezuela – the U.S. has imposed economic sanctions on.

Food production has collapsed in the country. Alexis Rodríguez Pérez, a senior official at the Ministry of Agriculture, said the country produced 15,200 tons of beef in the first six months of this year. As a comparison, Cuba produced 172,300 tons of beef in 2022, already down 40% from 289,100 in 1989.

 

Boston Globe article “Gov Abbott was right about the border”

Carine Hajjar has written a much needed article on how states like Massachusetts are feeling the effect of the Mexican border crisis. (I posted on this here and here.) Either party has been forthcoming about what is at the core of the border crisis: a system of awarding asylum which is both vitally important for world harmony and yet is unable to work reliably at today’s scale of global migration. The Biden administration has failed to level with the public about this, leaving even its supporters confused and dispirited. I am struck by how Pamala Harris has not been effectively challenged by the media or by Republicans.

The next administration needs to package asylum reform with other immigration changes.  While comprehensive overhaul seems unlikely, compromise over incremental reforms including asylum policy may – must – work.

Hajjar notes that Texas Governor Greg Abbott and Florida Governor Ron DeSantis have been warning about the burden of migrants crossing the border.

Massachusetts announced limitations to its migrant shelter policies after spending about $1 billion on emergency housing, including offering to pay for travel for eligible families to go to other states.

She writes that the Biden administration’s policies have played a central role in creating this crisis, from rolling back the Remain in Mexico policy to expanding humanitarian parole. [To be sure, the Remain in Mexico policy requires Mexican concurrence.]

Blue state leaders, Hajjar notes, have largely blamed Congress and former President Trump for the crisis, rather than directly criticizing the Biden administration. If Democratic leaders like Governor Healey were to acknowledge the current situation as a “Biden crisis,” it could pave the way for negotiations on border security and comprehensive immigration reform. This I agree with: a limited scope, compromise-arrived at agreement on immigration reform.

Biden has greatly cut back on Mexican border encounters. Here is how,

 

This posting is about the Mexican border, drawing largely upon a thoroughly researched report by WOLA.  If you work through this posting you will get a understanding of how measures undertaken by the Biden administration and some Central American countries are significantly reducing and adding more controls over entering the U.S.

(I want to note that asylum seekers having been showing up in larger numbers at the Canadian border.

Overlapping crackdowns have cut U.S. border encounters. Border crossings have dropped sharply as an immediate result of two overlapping 2024 crackdowns on migration, which have been especially hard on migrants seeking protection. First, since the beginning of the year, the government of Mexico has stepped up aggressive efforts to block migrants, busing tens of thousands of them to the southern part of the country. That caused migration between ports of entry (26 formally named as such) to drop by 50% from December 2023 to January 2024.

Second, in early June, the administration launched a second crackdown: a proclamation and rule refusing asylum to most people who cross the border between ports of entry during busy times. At least for now, the additional measure has cut migration in half again: a 52% drop in Border Patrol apprehensions from May to July 2024.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) wants to channel all asylum applications through its app. CPB One app, introduced in 2020 but only begun to be used a lot in early 2023. CBP has not adjusted the number of available appointments since June 2023. The border-wide maximum is 1,450 per day.

Texas’s state government crackdown has not reduced or deterred migration. Texas has not experienced a steeper migration decline than Arizona, where the Democratic governor has not pursued similar hard-line measures.

The drop in migration is plateauing. Migrants and smugglers go into a sort of “wait and see” mode as they learn how the new policy is being implemented. After migration “bottoms out,” it begins to recover and rise again, usually after a few months.

More migrants are dying even as migration drops. At Border Patrol ’s El Paso Sector, Border Patrol reported 164 remains recovered in the sector as of August 19, with six very hot weeks remaining in the 2024 fiscal year.

Releases from Border Patrol custody into the U.S. interior have dropped sharply. Due to strict implementation of the Biden administration’s June, 2024, asylum ban on persons crossing between ports of entry, releases from Border Patrol custody have plummeted: 12,110 people received a Notice to Appear (NTA) or parole in July 2024, 94% fewer than last December and the fewest since January 2021. Only 21% of migrants apprehended between ports of entry in July were released, the smallest percentage since January 2021.

Use of Expedited Removal has hit record levels. Nearly half of migrants apprehended between port of entry by Border Patrol in July 2024 were placed in expedited removal proceedings, a rapid process for deporting people without giving them hearings, usually while they are still in custody at the border, and with removal usually within a few days.

Venezuelans, Cubans, and Haitians have turned almost exclusively to CBP One and therefore formal, legal entry, rather than to try to enter between formal ports. That is lmosy likely due to the existence of the Humanitarian Parole program which admits 30,000 Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans. (Go here for an overview of Biden’s extensive use of Parole.)

The geographic diversity of migration has expanded. Border-wide through April, 11% of migrants apprehended by Border Patrol in fiscal 2024 were from Europe, Asia, or Africa, compared to 9% in FY 2023 and 4% in FY 2022.

Darién Gap migration has dropped. Panama’s new president, José Raúl Mulino, inaugurated on July 1, ordered a few miles of barbed wire laid along some frequently traveled routes through the Darién and, with U.S. financial backing, has now launched a program of deportation flights that appears to aim to operate at a tempo of three or four planes per week. This month, about 400 persons are completing the Darian Gap journey compared to about 2,000 a year ago.

Canada cutting back on immigration

Canada has been accepting permanent immigration at an effective rate of 1% of total population per year, and increased temporary foreign workers at an accelerated level. Here is a summary of a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation report:

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced a significant reduction in temporary foreign workers (TFWs) to address rising unemployment among immigrants and youth, spurred by a surge in low-wage TFWs post-pandemic. New restrictions will prevent employers in high-unemployment regions from hiring low-wage TFWs, except in critical sectors like agriculture, construction, and healthcare. The government will limit low-wage TFWs to one-year contracts and cap their proportion in any company to 10% of the workforce.

This  would reduce TFW numbers by about 65,000, returning to pre-pandemic levels. The move aims to alleviate pressures on the job and housing markets, with youth and newcomer unemployment rates hitting 13.5% and 11.6%, respectively.

The government is also considering broader immigration adjustments, with a review of permanent resident levels planned for the fall. This reflects growing concerns about the rapid pace of population growth, housing shortages, and economic challenges. The government maintains that any changes will be guided by economic and social needs to ensure Canada’s long-term success.